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How Early Did Anglo-American 
Trademark Law Begin?  An Answer to 
Schechter’s Conundrum 
Keith M. Stolte* 
It is possible that some day in some moldering mass of unpub-
lished records of the common law may be found a report of a case 
in the reign of Elizabeth by a clothier for infringement of his trade-
mark that will justify the authority with which Southern v. How has 
been so unanimously endowed. 
—Frank I. Schechter1 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is a new entry in the law books as the oldest reported 
trademark case in Anglo-American law.  It is known as Sand-
forth’s Case.2  Ironically, it was discovered through an obscure ref-
 
2. Sandforth’s Case, Cory’s Entries, BL MS. Hargrave 123, fo. 168 (1584) (provid-
ing a fairly complete portion of the complaint), reprinted in J.H. BAKER & S.F.C. 
MILSOM, SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY—PRIVATE LAW TO 1750 615-18 (1986); 
HLS MS. 2071, fo. 86 (providing a brief abstract of the case), reprinted in BAKER & 
MILSOM, supra, at 615-18; HLS MS. 5048 fo. 118v. (formerly catalogued as HLS MS. 
Acc. 704755, fo 118v.) (providing another brief abstract of the case), reprinted in BAKER 
& MILSOM, supra, at 615.  Other unpublished references to the case are found in CUL 
MS. Ii 5. 38, fo. 132; HLS MS. 2074, fo. 84v.; and BL MS. Lansdowne 1086, fo. 74v.  
There is a discrepancy among the six sources as to the name of the case.  For example, in 
BL MS. Hargrave 123, fo. 168v. the name of the case is apparently Sandford’s Case.  
J.H. BAKER, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH HISTORY 385 n.45 (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter 
ENGLISH HISTORY I].  In CUL MS. Ii. 5. 38, fo. 132, the case name is Samforde, and in 
HLS MS. 2074, fo. 84v, it is Sandforth’s Case.  In view of this conflict, and intending to 
modernize the name of the case, Professor Baker chose to name the case J.G. v. Samford 
in the 1990 edition of his book Introduction to English History.  J.H. BAKER, 
INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH HISTORY 522 n.68 (3d ed. 1990) [hereinafter ENGLISH 
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reference in a seventeenth century lawsuit that previously claimed 
the title of oldest trademark case. 
History has generally honored Southern v. How,3 decided in 
1618, as the first reported trademark case in Anglo-American 
law4—despite the fact it was not a trademark case at all, but one 
that involved the sale of counterfeit jewels.5  Its connection with 
trademark law arose out of Judge Dodderidge’s dictum in that 
case, wherein the learned judge made a brief reference to an ear-
lier, unnamed and apparently unreported case that involved a suit 
brought against a cloth maker who used another cloth maker’s 
mark.6  That lawsuit—published as Sandforth’s Case—may now 
be declared the earliest reported trademark case in Anglo-
American law. 
For four centuries, the obscure reference made in Southern v. 
How served as the foundation for all subsequent trademark law 
and, more broadly, the law of unfair competition.7  But Southern v. 
How provides a feeble and problematic basis for the development 
of the law of trademarks and unfair competition in England, the 
British Commonwealth, and the United States.  For example, some 
prominent scholars, particularly Frank Schechter,8 argue that the 
 
HISTORY II].  To preserve the historical quality of the case, this Article uses the name des-
ignated in HLS MS. 2074, fo. 84., that is, Sandforth’s Case. 
3. Popham’s Reports 143 (1618), 79 Eng. Rep. 1243 (K.B. 1907); J. Bridgeman’s 
Reports 125 (1659), 123 Eng. Rep. 1248 (K.B. 1912); Cro. Jac. 468 (1659), 79 Eng. Rep. 
400 (K.B. 1907); 2 Rolle’s Reports 5 (1676), 81 Eng. Rep. 621 (K.B. 1908); 2 Rolle’s 
Reports 26 (1676), 81 Eng. Rep. 635 (K.B. 1908). 
4. See JEROME GILSON & JEFFREY M. SAMUELS, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND 
PRACTICE § 1.01[1] (1997); JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS, 
TRADENAMES AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 15-16 (4th ed. 1924); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5:2 (1996); EDWARD S. 
ROGERS, GOOD WILL, TRADE-MARKS AND UNFAIR TRADING 34 (1914); SCHECHTER, supra 
note 1, at 6-9. 
5. Southern v. How, Popham’s Reports at 143, 79 Eng. Rep. at 1243-44. 
6. Id. at 144, 79 Eng. Rep. at 1244. 
7. See GILSON, supra note 4, at § 1.01[1]; MCCARTHY, supra note 4, at § 5:2; 
SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 5-6, 9, 123. 
8. The scholarly contributions made by Frank Schechter during the 1920’s have sig-
nificantly influenced the law of trademarks during the twentieth century, especially in the 
United States.  Most trademark practitioners know of Schechter as the father of the doc-
trine of trademark dilution.  His 1927 law review article, The Rational Basis of Trade-
mark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1927), was the first to propose the dilution the-
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case is practically worthless in demonstrating that the common law 
of trademarks developed any earlier than the advent of the Indus-
trial Revolution.9  Schechter has declared Sykes v. Sykes,10 decided 
in 1824, to be “the first reported case squarely involving the pro-
tection of trade-marks by an English common law court.”11  Many 
other scholars and the courts are less assertive; they simply tend to 
avoid the question as to the availability of relief for trademark in-
fringement or unfair competition prior to the nineteenth century.12 
 
ory that has occupied so much of the scholarly literature on trademark law in the last 40 
years.  Less known is Schechter’s seminal work on the history of trademarks, The His-
torical Foundations of the Law Relating to Trade-Marks, supra note 1, which is still un-
surpassed as the most comprehensive and reliable authority on the subject. 
The following anecdote serves as a testament to the importance of Schechter’s his-
torical work in the area of trademark scholarship and demonstrates that even Oliver 
Wendell Holmes recognized Schechter’s contribution: 
Though the Court was in recess, Holmes was formally attired in the cutaway, 
striped trousers, and stiff bosom shirt with a winged collar.  He sat at his desk 
on the fourth floor of his home overlooking the garden.  The two justices 
[Holmes and Justice Stone] did most of the talking . . . .  Turning to Stone, 
Holmes observed that in the course of writing an opinion in a trademark case, 
he had occasion to read a fascinating book on the history of the law and usage 
of trademarks.  Stone inquired whether Holmes was referring to a doctoral dis-
sertation by Frank Schechter on the historical foundations of the law of trade-
marks.  Holmes responded that that was the book he had in mind.  Stone then 
told him that he had persuaded Schechter, who was trademark counsel for the 
BVD company, to take a year off from his practice and to be the first candidate 
for a doctoral degree in law at Columbia.  When Holmes learned that Stone had 
inspired the writing of this book, he rose, walked across the room, shook 
Stone’s hand and said, “I congratulate you on one of the great acts of your life.” 
Milton W. Handler, Are the State Antidilution Laws Compatible with the National Pro-
tection of Trademarks, 75 TRADEMARK REP. 269, 270-71 (1985) (citation omitted).  Even 
Milton Handler, who has severely criticized Schechter’s theory of trademark dilution, 
acknowledged that Schechter’s book on the history of trademarks inspired his own im-
pressive career in the trademark field from 1927 to the present.  Id. at 271. 
9. See SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 8-10, 123 (criticizing the reliance of courts and 
legal commentators on Southern v. How as the initial basis for Anglo-American trade-
mark law and the law of unfair competition due to the unavailing mysteries created by 
differing reports of the case). 
10. 107 Eng. Rep. 834 (K.B. 1824). 
11. SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 137. 
12. See SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 6-10, 123; see also discussion infra notes 50-
75 and accompanying text (providing a historical demonstration of how the courts and 
trademark scholars have treated the case).  Schechter, who argued that the usage and 
regulation of trademarks by medieval and renaissance guilds established the antiquity of 
trademark law in England and throughout Europe, nevertheless stated that most commen-
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We can now dispense altogether with Southern v. How, in fa-
vor of Sandforth’s Case.  There is now little doubt that Sandforth’s 
Case was the very case to which Judge Dodderidge made brief ref-
erence in Southern v. How.13  Sandforth’s Case conclusively dem-
onstrates that the English courts recognized a common law right 
against trademark infringement as early as 1584, some two hun-
dred and fifty years before the Industrial Revolution caused a surge 
in the development of this area of the law on both sides of the At-
lantic.14  Ironically, like Southern v. How, one of the two extant ab-
stracts of Sandforth makes brief reference to an unreported case 
involving counterfeiting activity, apparently heard in the House of 
Commons in 1558.15  While it may be another four hundred years 
before this even earlier case surfaces, the brief treatment of the par-
liamentary action in Sandforth’s Case strengthens the conclusion 
that trademark infringement and unfair competition was a violation 
of English law as early as the mid-sixteenth century. 
This Article introduces Sandforth’s Case to practitioners and 
trademark scholars and provides a brief analysis of the case, par-
ticularly in the contexts of sixteenth century commerce and law re-
porting. Part I explores the problems posed by, and the historical 
treatment accorded to, the brief reference of the case that appeared 
in Southern v. How.  Part II introduces Sandforth’s Case as the true 
 
tators assign the origin of the common law protection of trademarks to the early nine-
teenth century.  SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 11, 16.  According to Schechter: 
[T]hose who have attained pre-eminence either as practitioners or as text-
writers of trade-mark law have with few exceptions been quite content to re-
gard that law as practically the creation of the nineteenth century, without at-
tempting in any way to ascertain the extent to which trade-marks had been used 
prior to the nineteenth century, the functions or purposes which these trade-
marks had served and the methods, if any, by which they came under any form 
of legal protection or surveillance. 
Id.; see also DUNCAN MACKENZIE KERLY, LAW OF TRADE MARKS AND TRADE NAMES 2 
(5th ed. 1923) (stating that “[t]he law on this subject cannot be traced back further than 
the nineteenth century”); SEBASTIAN, TRADE MARK REGISTRATION 3 (2d ed. 1922) (stat-
ing that “it is possible that this right [to trademark protection] was recognized as early as 
the reign of Queen Elizabeth; it was at any rate established in 1833”). 
13. See BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2, at 617 n.18. 
14. See infra notes 101-142 and accompanying text (providing a comprehensive 
analysis of Sandforth’s Case). 
15. Sandforth’s Case, Cory’s Entries, HLS MS. 5048, fo. 118v, reprinted in BAKER 
& MILSOM, supra note 2, at 615. 
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foundation of Anglo-American trademark law, yet never cited by 
any English or American court.  Part III explores the impact of 
Sandforth’s Case and demonstrates that it clearly established 
trademark infringement as a violation of sixteenth century common 
law.  This Article concludes that Sandforth’s Case is the bridge, 
sought by legal scholars, between trademark regulation by the me-
dieval English trade guilds and the birth of modern trademark ju-
risprudence in the common law courts of the nineteenth century. 
I. SOUTHERN V. HOW: THE BASIS OF TRADEMARK LAW OR “AN 
IRRELEVANT DICTUM OF A REMINISCENT JUDGE”? 
For centuries, the case of Southern v. How has been subject to 
significant controversy.16  The question at the center of this unend-
ing debate is whether the case demonstrates that the English com-
mon law of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries cultivated a tort 
of trademark infringement and unfair competition, or whether the 
case should be discarded as nothing more than a vehicle for an ir-
relevant, highly ambiguous piece of legal gossip.17  Whatever the 
answer was during the 380 year period since the case was first 
heard, there is no question that, until now, Southern v. How has 
been universally regarded as the first to make reference to an ac-
tion at law involving what we would call trademark infringement.18 
A. The Reporting of Southern v. How 
Southern v. How has historically engendered controversy as to 
its value in the development of Anglo-American trademark law 
because the case was reported in at least five abstracts by four dif-
ferent chroniclers at five different times.19  As one may expect, 
each of the five versions of the case differs in its treatment of an 
 
16. See discussion infra notes 51-76 and accompanying text (analyzing the continu-
ing controversy on the relevance of the case to origins of trademark law). 
17. See SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 7-12, 123-26 (characterizing the import of the 
case in the development of Anglo-American law of trademarks as “an irrelevant dictum 
of a reminiscent judge”). 
18. See GILSON, supra note 4, at § 1.01[1]; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 4, at § 
5:2; SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 9-11. 
19. See discussion infra notes 21-48 and accompanying text (examining the five 
reported versions of the case); see also supra note 3 (citing the five versions of Sand-
forth’s Case). 
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earlier, unnamed, unreported case during the reign of Elizabeth I.  
Two of the versions do not even mention the earlier case; of the 
three that do make reference to the earlier case, one indicates that 
the senior user of the infringed mark was the plaintiff in the case, 
while two state that the plaintiff was a purchaser of the infringing 
goods.  The differing versions do not even agree on the year the 
case was decided.20 
The first published abstract of Southern v. How appeared in 
Popham’s Reports in 1656.21  That report assigns the decision to 
Trinity term, 15 Jac. I,22 that is, 1618.  The case was a suit heard by 
the King’s Bench involving a civil charge of deceit.  The plaintiff 
alleged that the defendant, through his servant, sold him counter-
feit jewels. 
Although Southern v. How was not in any sense a case involv-
ing trademarks, Judge Dodderidge recalled in dicta an earlier case, 
which he assumed to be an action heard on the tort of deceit.23  
According to the abstract in Popham’s Report, that earlier action 
was brought in the Court of Common Pleas by a “clothier,” who 
(1) had gained a “great reputation” as a skilled clothier, (2) “had 
 
20. In fact, there is a discrepancy between the five abstracts even as to the year that 
Southern v. How was heard. 
21. Popham’s Reports 143, 79 Eng. Rep. 1243.  Popham’s Reports is an important 
collection of numerous abstracts of early common law cases.  But the author, Popham, 
did not report the case of Southern v. How, which was actually published after his death.  
The abstract had been reported presumably by successors of Popham’s enterprise and in-
cluded in the book under a section entitled “Some Remarkable Cases Reported by Other 
Learned Pens Since His Death.” 
22. The term “15 Jac. I” refers to the 15th year of the reign of James I. 
23. See infra notes 27-28 and accompanying text (discussing the nature of the 
common law tort of deceit during the sixteenth century).  According to the opinion re-
ported in Popham’s Reports: 
Dod[d]eridge said, that 22 Eliz., the action upon the case was brought in the 
[Court of] Common Pleas by a clothier, that whereas he had gained great repu-
tation for his making of his cloth by reason whereof he had great utterance to 
his benefit and profit, and that he used to set his mark on his cloth whereby it 
should be known to be his cloth; and another clothier, observing it, used the 
same mark to his ill-made cloth on purpose to deceive him, and it was resolved 
that the action did well lie. 
Southern v. How, Popham’s Reports, at 144, 79 Eng. Rep. at 1244.  The term “22 Eliz.” 
refers to the twenty-second year of the reign of Elizabeth I, that is, 1580. 
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great utterance to his benefit and profit,”24 and (3) affixed “his 
mark on his cloth whereby it should be known to be his cloth,” 
against another clothier who, upon “observing [the other clothier’s 
mark], used the same mark to his ill-made cloth on purpose to de-
ceive him.”25  In that case, “it was resolved that the action did well 
lie.”26 
The abstract of Southern v. How in Popham’s Reports makes 
clear that the plaintiff in the earlier, unnamed case is the senior 
trademark user and not a consumer, but the reference appears to 
state that the action was one that fit into the developing doctrine of 
tortious deceit.27  There is no indication in the abstract that the case 
occupied a new cause of action for trademark infringement or un-
fair competition, though this is a possibility.28  Nevertheless, Dod-
 
24. Id.  The phrase “great utterance” undoubtedly means the clothier attained a high 
level of fame for his cloths and success in his business.  See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L 
DICTIONARY 2526 (1986) (defining utterance as “the sale or disposal (as of goods or 
commodities) to the public”). 
25. Popham’s Reports, at 144, 79 Eng. Rep. at 1244. 
26. Id. 
27. The tort of deceit has a long and meandering history.  Over time, a line of cases 
generated a doctrine that an action for deceit would lie where a seller of merchandise 
warranted the quality or character of his merchandise, but later delivered goods of lesser 
quality.  Some early cases also required privity, or a relation of trust, between the parties 
at suit.  See, e.g., BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2, at 506-23. 
28. At this period of English legal history, a warranty of quality and some form of 
privity between the parties were usually required before an action for deceit would lie.  
See supra note 27 (discussing prior and contemporaneous cases that require a warranty 
and privity for the tort of deceit in commercial transactions); see also Paula J. Dalley, The 
Law of Deceit, 1790-1860:  Continuity Amidst Change, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 405, 412-
13 (1995) (stating that during the Medieval and Renaissance periods, the tort of deceit 
required proof of a warranty).  According to Dalley, Southern v. How was the only re-
ported case of the period in which an action laid for deceit, merely on the basis of the de-
fendant’s scienter, without any showing of a warranty.  Id. at 412-13.  Some cases, how-
ever, appear to have sounded in deceit where no warranty existed but where the 
defendant had actual knowledge that the merchandise sold contained a defect.  See 
Caryll’s Reports, Keil 91, pl. 16 (1505).  Despite this anomaly, ordinarily the cases of the 
period required a warranty.  The account in Popham’s indicates that the plaintiff was the 
senior user of the mark and makes no mention of any warranty made by either party or 
any prior relationship of trust or privity.  Southern v. How, Popham’s Reports 144, 79 
Eng. Rep. 1244.  It may be that the common law tort of commercial deceit was expanding 
at this time to include cases where no warranty or privity needed to exist between the par-
ties.  Alternatively, the unnamed case Dodderidge cited may have recognized a new 
cause of action, beyond the established common law tort of deceit.  See discussion infra 
notes 143-151 and accompanying text for an analysis of this possibility. 
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deridge appears to characterize the action as an intentional deceit 
on the senior trademark user by the defendant. 
The second report of Southern v. How appeared in J. Bridge-
man’s Reports, published in 1659, four years after the Popham’s 
version appeared.29  The Bridgeman’s abstract cites Southern v. 
How as decided in 1616,30 two years before the date ascribed by 
the abstract in Popham’s Reports.  This report of the case makes 
no reference to Judge Dodderidge’s discussion of the earlier cloth-
ier’s case, and is therefore of little use except to demonstrate the 
inconsistencies in the five reports of Southern v. How. 
The third abstract of the case was published in Croke’s Re-
ports, also in 1659.31  The Croke’s version, like that in Popham’s, 
indicates that Southern v. How was heard in the year 1618 and, like 
the abstract in Popham’s, it included a reference to Judge Dodde-
ridge’s discussion in dicta of an earlier clothier’s case.  The 
Croke’s version of the earlier clothier’s case, however, contains 
striking inconsistencies with the Popham’s version. 
According to the version in Croke’s Reports, Judge Dodde-
ridge referred to a case from the Court of Common Pleas, in which 
(1) “a clothier of Gloucestershire sold very good cloth, so that in 
London if they saw any cloth of his mark they would buy it with-
out searching thereof;”32 (2) “another who made ill cloth put his 
 
29. Southern v. How, J. Bridgeman’s Reports, 125, 123 Eng. Rep. 1248. 
30. The abstract indicates that the case was heard during the Hilary Term, “13 Jac. 
I,” that is, during the thirteenth year of the reign of James I. 
31. Southern v. How, Cro. Jac. 468, 79 Eng. Rep. 400.  According to Croke’s Re-
ports: 
Dodderidge cited a case to be adjudged 33 Eliz. in the [Court of] Common 
Pleas:  a clothier of Gloucestershire sold very good cloth, so that in London if 
they saw any cloth of his mark they would buy it without searching thereof; and 
another who made ill cloth put his mark upon it without his [the senior user’s] 
privity; and an action upon the case was brought by him who bought the cloth, 
for this deceit; and adjudged maintainable. 
Id. at 471, 79 Eng. Rep. at 402.  The term “33 Eliz.” indicates that the case was heard 
during the thirty-third year of the reign of Elizabeth I, that is, in 1591. 
32. Id.  Presumably the term “they” means consumers or retailers of cloth.  As a 
whole, this statement probably means that prospective consumers or retailers relied on 
the trademark appearing on the cloth to signify the quality of the cloth, thereby alleviat-
ing the need to diligently inspect the goods to assure themselves of the quality of each 
individual article. 
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mark upon it without his [the senior user’s] privity;”33 and (3)”an 
action upon the case was brought by him who bought the cloth, for 
this deceit.”34  Also, as in the Popham’s abstract, the case was “ad-
judged maintainable.”35 
Croke’s abstract of Southern v. How includes certain details of 
the earlier clothier’s case which the Popham’s version did not pro-
vide.  For example, a more definite picture of the plaintiff in that 
case has emerged, to wit, that (1) he was a clothier from Glouces-
tershire, (2) he sold his goods beyond his locale—specifically in 
London, (3) he had a considerable reputation for the quality of his 
cloths, and (4) he used his mark to embody the good-will and fame 
of his business.36  Another very interesting difference between 
Croke’s version and that of Popham is that Croke’s report identi-
fies the plaintiff as the purchaser of the infringing cloths, not the 
senior user of the mark.  This version of the unnamed clothier’s 
case, therefore, found that consumers of infringing goods could 
have an action for deceit against the infringer, although it is not 
clear from Croke’s account whether the senior user of the mark 
could likewise find relief at law.37  Unsurprisingly, the discrepancy 
between the versions as to the identity of the plaintiff became the 
most contentious aspect of the controversy surrounding Southern v. 
How.38  Be that as it may, we know that Anglo-American trade-
mark law certainly did not develop in accordance with Croke’s 
version.39 
 
33. Id.  In other words, without authorization.  This language may offer a slight hint 
that it was commonplace for manufacturers of cloths to contract with others regarding the 
use of their trademarks. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Allowing a purchaser of inferior merchandise an action for deceit against an in-
fringer who uses a mark, known to convey a reputation of quality, seems to fit better 
within the doctrine of the tort of deceit as developed by the seventeenth century.  In such 
a case, the trademark could be viewed as serving as an acceptable type of warranty and 
there would be privity between the infringer and the purchaser.  See supra note 27 (dis-
cussing cases requiring the existence of a warranty and privity in cases involving deceit). 
38. See GILSON, supra note 4, at § 1.01[1]; see also SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 8-
10. 
39. See generally Colligan v. Activities Club of New York, Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 170 
U.S.P.Q. 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971) (holding that consumers have 
no standing to bring an action for trademark infringement); GILSON, supra note 4, § 
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The last two abstracts of Southern v. How appeared in Rolle’s 
Reports, which was published in 1676.  The two reports are not 
consistent.  The first of the two abstracts agrees with Popham’s 
version, which stated that Southern v. How was heard in 1618, but 
like the abstract published in J. Bridgeman’s Reports, this report 
fails to mention Judge Dodderidge’s dictum about the earlier cloth-
ier’s case.40  The second Rolle’s abstract, however, assigns the date 
of Southern v. How as 1619,41 and does in fact refer to Dodde-
ridge’s comments on the earlier case.42 
As reported in the second Rolle’s abstract, Justice Dodderidge 
referred to a case in the Court of Common Pleas involving “a 
clothier of Gloucester [who] made cloths which were more expen-
sive and more saleable than the cloths of any other, and he put a 
special mark on them which no other clothier had before that.”43  
Subsequently, “[another] clothier had counterfeited said mark and 
placed it on his cloths, which were not as good but which he sold 
at the same price as the other by this deceit.”44  The second Rolle’s 
abstract concluded, likewise to the abstracts in Popham’s and 
Croke’s, that an action “was deemed . . . against” the defendant “in 
this case,” but, unlike the Popham’s and Croke’s abstracts, Judge 
Dodderidge “did not say by which of the two the action was 
 
1.01[1] (noting that courts have not yet recognized a consumer’s action for trademark 
infringement).  Gilson states that the idea of permitting consumers to sue for trademark 
infringement is “a concept so advanced that even today in the age of consumerism the 
courts have not yet come to recognize it.”  GILSON, supra note 4, at § 1.01[1]. 
40. Southern v. How, 2 Rolle’s Reports 5, 81 Eng. Rep. 621. 
41. This abstract indicates that the case was heard during the Trinity Term, “16 Jac. 
I,” that is, during the sixteenth year of the reign of James I. 
42. Southern v. How, 2 Rolle’s Reports 26, 81 Eng. Rep. 635.  According to the 
second abstract in Rolle’s Reports: 
Justice Dod[d]eridge in 23 Eliz. in the [Court of] Common Pleas; the case was 
that a clothier of Gloucester made cloths which were more expensive and more 
saleable than the cloths of any other, and he put a special mark on them which 
no other clothier had before that; and after a [another] clothier had counter-
feited said mark and placed it on his cloths, which were not as good but which 
he sold at the same price as the other by this deceit; [it] was deemed that the ac-
tion was against him in this case, but Mr. Justice Dod[d]eridge did not say by 
which of the two the action was brought, i.e. by the clothier who first had the 
mark, or by the purchaser, although it seems to have been by the purchaser. 
Id.  This abstract reports that the earlier case was heard in 1581. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
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brought, i.e., by the clothier who first had the mark, or by the pur-
chaser, although it seems to have been by the purchaser.”45 
The second Rolle’s abstract points to two further aspects of the 
senior trademark user: (1) his cloths were reputed to be the most 
expensive and famous in the region, and (2) he apparently had the 
exclusive use of his mark as applied to cloths.  That report also 
suggests that the defendant passed-off his inferior infringing cloths 
at the same price as the senior user’s cloths.  It seems clear that 
Rolle was familiar with the previously reported abstracts because 
he specifically highlighted the discrepancy between the report in 
Popham and the abstract in Croke’s on the issue of who the plain-
tiff was.46  Rolle awkwardly posited that Dodderidge failed to indi-
cate whether the plaintiff in the earlier case was the senior trade-
mark user or a duped purchaser, although he proffered his own 
opinion that it was the purchaser.47 
As demonstrated above, the five extant abstracts of Southern v. 
How are rife with inconsistencies.  Despite the conflicting reports, 
the case has been universally cited as the foundation for the devel-
opment of the Anglo-American law of trademarks and unfair com-
petition.48  In response, Frank Schechter and other commentators 
have pointed out that the conflicting accounts of Southern v. How 
render the case an enfeebled and worthless precedent on which to 
 
45. Id. 
46. The publication of Rolle’s Reports was pre-dated by Popham’s Reports by 20 
years and Croke’s Reports by 15 years. 
47. Rolle may have favored Croke’s view that the purchaser was the plaintiff be-
cause such a view would fit better within the action for deceit as developed by 1676.  See 
supra notes 27, 28, 37 (discussing the general requirements of a warranty and privity be-
tween the parties for an action in deceit to lie). 
48. See, e.g., SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 9.  Schechter, who apparently had grave 
misgivings about assigning an important historical role to Southern v. How because of the 
mass of inconsistencies appearing between the five different reports, lamented: 
Despite the fact that Dodderidge’s reminiscence,—whatever it was—was pure 
dictum, and despite the conflict of evidence as to what the dictum was, South-
ern v. How appears to have acquired considerable weight as authority for the 
proposition that the unauthorized use of a trade-mark is unlawful and may be 
the subject of an action in deceit. 
Id.  Schechter added that “[t]he English Courts have unequivocally relied upon the au-
thority in Southern v. How to establish the antiquity of their jurisdiction to prevent trade-
mark piracy.”  Id. 
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lay the foundation of trademark law.49 
B. The Historical Treatment of Southern v. How By Courts 
and Legal Scholars 
The earliest court decisions bearing on the law of trademarks 
and unfair competition make copious references to Southern v. 
How as primary authority to grant legal and equitable relief for an 
infringer’s misappropriation of another’s trade identity.50  The case 
of Blanchard v. Hill,51 the first case to cite Southern v. How, is 
generally regarded as the second English case on trademarks to be 
reported.52  That case, dated 1742, involved a suit for an injunction 
by a playing card merchant against another for use of the mark 
“GREAT MOGUL” on playing cards.53 
In denying the injunction, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke de-
clared, “I do not know of any instance of granting an injunction 
here, to restrain one trader from using the same mark with another; 
and I think it would be of mischievous consequence to do it.”54  
The plaintiff’s attorney, in support of the injunction, cited the un-
named reference in Southern v. How, to which the Lord Chancellor 
 
49. Id. at 8-9; see infra notes 66-76 and accompanying text (discussing the hostility 
by some commentators to Southern v. How). 
50. See SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 9-12 (discussing nineteenth century English 
cases declaring that Southern v. How is the starting point for the law of trademarks). 
51. 26 Eng. Rep. 692 (Ch. 1742). 
52. Id.  The case was dismissed by a court of equity for lack of jurisdiction. 
53. Id. at 693.  The senior user of the mark claimed a privilege of monopoly to the 
use of the mark by virtue of the grant of a royal charter bestowed during the seventeenth 
century upon his company, which apparently provided for the exclusive use of the 
“GREAT MOGUL” mark on playing cards.  Id.  Although Lord Chancellor Hardwicke 
found that the charter was valid insofar as the creation of the company, he emphatically 
denied that a royal grant of monopoly to a trademark was legal.  Id. 
54. Id.  Some commentators suggest that Lord Chancellor Hardwicke’s denial of an 
injunction demonstrated that an action for trademark infringement was essentially legal 
during this early period and not susceptible to the courts of equity.  See, e.g., Gary M. 
Ropski, The Federal Trademark Jury Trial—Awakening of a Dormant Constitutional 
Right, 70 TRADEMARK REP. 177, 179-80 (1980).  Such a claim overstates the significance 
of Lord Chancellor Hardwicke’s comments.  By the time that Blanchard v. Hill was 
heard, the courts, both legal and chancery, became quite hostile to any past monopolies 
granted by the monarchy and not granted by a statute of Parliament.  See Motte v. Ben-
nett, 17 F. Cas. 909, 913-14 (D.S.C. 1849) (discussing the hostility in the English courts 
of equity to any royal grants of monopoly rights).  In some senses, Blanchard v. Hill is as 
much a political decision as one based on the principles of equity. 
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Hardwicke commented, “[b]ut it was not the single act of making 
use of the mark that was sufficient to maintain the action, but do-
ing it with a fraudulent design, to put off bad cloths by this means, 
or to draw away customers from the other clothier.”55  By thus dis-
tinguishing the circumstances of the unnamed case discussed in 
Dodderidge’s dictum in Southern v. How from the facts of Blanch-
ard v. Hill, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke suggested that had the de-
fendant playing card merchant used the “GREAT MOGUL” mark 
to pass off his cards as those of the plaintiff, then an action at law, 
if not in equity, could indeed lie.56  If this is the case, Lord Chan-
cellor Hardwicke recognized Southern v. How as valid precedent 
for an action of unfair competition. 
The third reported action for trademark infringement, Singleton 
v. Bolton,57 was heard in 1783.  Although the abstract does not 
mention Southern v. How, Lord Mansfield stated that “if the de-
fendant had sold a medicine of his own under the plaintiff’s name 
or mark, that would be a fraud for which an action would lie.”58  
The next six English cases bearing on the law of trademarks or un-
fair competition seem to display a judicial ambivalence to the 
value of Southern v. How; most fail to cite it at all, and the two that 
do reference the case cite it in passing and attach no significance to 
it.59 
By the 1840s, the courts in both Great Britain and the United 
States, finding a need to establish “the antiquity of their jurisdic-
tion to prevent trade-mark piracy,”60 began paying homage to 
Southern v. How as the foundation for granting relief against 
 
55. Blanchard, 26 Eng. Rep. at 693. 
56. See D.M. KERLY, LAW OF TRADE MARKS AND TRADE NAMES 2 (T.A. Blanco 
White & Robin Jacobs eds., 12th ed. 1986). 
57. 99 Eng. Rep. 661 (K.B. 1783). 
58. Id. (footnote omitted). 
59. See Blofeld v. Payne, 110 Eng. Rep. 509 (K.B. 1833) (failing to mention South-
ern v. How); Sykes v. Sykes, 107 Eng. Rep. 834 (K.B. 1824) (failing to mention Southern 
v. How); Seddon v. Senate, 104 Eng. Rep. 290 (K.B. 1810) (failing to mention Southern 
v. How); Motley v. Downman, 40 Eng. Rep. 824 (Ch. 1837) (citing and providing details 
of Southern v. How); Canham v. Jones, 35 Eng. Rep. 302 (Ch. 1813) (declaring the ar-
gument made by the defendant’s attorney that Southern v. How requires that the infring-
ing goods be inferior and not merely bear a spurious mark); Hogg v. Kirby, 32 Eng. Rep. 
336 (Ch. 1803) (failing to mention Southern v. How). 
60. SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 9. 
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trademark infringement or unfair competition.61  During the twen-
tieth century, the courts continued to cite Southern v. How as the 
starting point of common law recognition of trademark rights.62  
Even in the 1990s, judicial recognition of Southern v. How as the 
foundation for Anglo-American trademark rights apparently still 
has significant impetus.63 
 
61. See Fowle v. Spear, 9 F. Cas. 611, 612 (C.C.E.D. Penn. 1847) (No. 4,996); Tay-
lor v. Carpenter, 23 F. Cas. 744, 748 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846) (No. 13,785); Taylor v. Car-
penter, 23 F. Cas. 742 (C.C.D. Mass. 1844) (No. 13,784) (Storey, J.); Clinton Metallic 
Paint Co. v. New York Metallic Paint Co., 50 N.Y.S. 437, 442 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1898) (de-
claring that the common law of trademark infringement dates back “as early as 1590” to 
the Southern v. How case, as reported in Popham’s Reports); Crawshay v. Thompson, 
134 Eng. Rep. 146, 157-58 (C.P. 1842); Hall v. Barrows, 32 L.J.K.B. 548, 551 (Ch. 
1863) (stating that “[i]t was established as early as Popham’s Reports that an action at 
law would lie for the piracy of a trade-mark”); Burgess v. Burgess, 43 Eng. Rep. 351, 353 
(Ch. 1853) (declaring that the “law on the subject [of trademark infringement] is as old as 
Southern v. How in Popham’s Reports”); Hirst v. Denham, 14 L.R.-Eq. 542, 549 (M.R. 
1872).  Some attorneys during this period thought the case could be used in fields beyond 
mere trademark law.  In 1839, the plaintiff in a case involving the fraudulent sale of a 
human slave in Washington, D.C., apparently found something in Southern v. How to 
support his argument that the buyer of the slave deceived the plaintiff into under-pricing 
the slave.  See Fenwick v. Grimes, 8 F. Cas. 1144, 1145 (C.C.D.C. 1839) (No. 4,734). 
62. See Magnolia Metal Co. v. Tandem Smelting Synd., Ltd., 17 R.P.C. 477, 483-84 
(1900).  In this case, Lord Halsbury, citing Southern v. How, waxes poetic, if somewhat 
ineloquently, on the antiquity of the British common law of trademarks stating: 
[T]hat cause of action is, as I have said, a very old and a familiar one . . . .  Go-
ing back, therefore, as far as the reign of Elizabeth the form of action which the 
Statement of Claim adopts has undoubtedly been a form of action in which if 
the right of a man to have the reputation of selling that which is his manufac-
ture as his manufacture, the right to prevent other people [from] fraudulently 
stating that it is their manufacture when it is not—if that right is infringed there 
is a remedy.  That has, as I have said, ever since the reign of Elizabeth, been es-
tablished in our Courts as being a right of action upon which anybody may sue 
who has a ground for doing so. 
Id. at 484; see also Stephano Bros., Inc. v. Stamatopoulos, 238 F. 89, 91 (2d Cir. 1916) 
(“The right to an exclusive trade-mark is not one created by act of Congress.  It is a right 
which the common-law courts recognized at an early day.” (citing Southern v. How, Po-
pham’s Reports 143 (1582))); Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 520 F. Supp. 
395, 397 (D. Utah 1981) (citing Southern v. How to establish the root of the common law 
prohibition against passing-off). 
63. See Kenner Parker Toys, Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 354 n.1 
(Fed. Cir. 1992).  Judge Rader stated: 
In this earliest reference to trademarks in the King’s courts, the Judge sustained 
the action of a high-quality clothier against a maker of ill-made cloth who af-
fixed the mark of the high-grade clothier to inferior products.  This early case 
illustrates that trademarks function as guarantors of quality, suppliers of infor-
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Although some trademark scholars have slavishly followed the 
view of the courts that Southern v. How has significant value in es-
tablishing the earliest common law of trademarks and unfair com-
petition,64 others have merely cited the case as a potential starting 
point for the law.65  Still other scholars have been even more am-
bivalent about the import of the case and have been skeptical to as-
signing it much value at all.  The most hostile treatment of the case 
comes from Frank Schechter’s book The Historical Foundations of 
the Law Relating to Trade-Marks,66 which, after almost seventy-
five years, remains the most comprehensive and reliable source on 
the subject.  Assigning the case to the trash bin of irrelevancy, 
Schechter devoted more than seven pages of his book to discredit-
 
mation to consumers seeking a reliable source of products, insurers of proper 
allocation of reward to investors in the good will and reputation of a trade 
name, in short, preservers of property rights and responsibilities. 
Id.  It is unlikely that anyone anticipated in 1618, when Southern v. How was heard, that 
Judge Dodderidge’s dictum could amount to so much.  The musical group New Kids on 
the Block would probably hope that the case provided even greater scope than that ac-
corded to it by Judge Rader.  See New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, 
Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 305 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Southern v. How and stating that “[t]he law 
has protected trademarks since the early seventeenth century, and the primary focus of 
trademark law has been misappropriation—the problem of one producer’s placing his 
rival’s mark on his own goods”).  Unfortunately for the New Kids on the Block, the 
courts have never declared Southern v. How to prohibit non-trademark use of someone 
else’s mark.  Id. 
64. See HOPKINS, supra note 4, at 12-13; Kenneth R. Pierce, The Trademark Law 
Revision Act:  Origins of the Use Requirement and an Overview of the New Federal 
Trademark Law, 64 FLA. B.J. 35, 36 (1990); Kenneth L. Port, Foreword to Symposium on 
Intellectual Property Law Theory, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 585, 595 (1993) (erroneously 
stating that the judgment of the unnamed case cited by Judge Dodderidge in Southern v. 
How was decided in the defendant’s favor); Kenneth L. Port, The Illegitimacy of Trade-
mark Incontestability, 26 IND. L. REV. 519, 522 (1993) (repeating the same error); An-
drew Ruff, Comment, Releasing the Grays:  In Support of Legalizing Parallel Imports, 
11 U.C.L.A. PAC. BASIN L.J. 119, 129 n.66 (1992). 
65. See GILSON, supra note 4, at § 1.01[1]; MCCARTHY, supra note 4, at § 5:2; 
BEVERLY W. PATTISHALL ET AL., TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 2 (2d ed. 
1994); EDWARD S. ROGERS, GOOD WILL TRADE-MARKS AND UNFAIR TRADING 34 (1914); 
Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Developments of Trademarks, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 
265, 287 n.63 (1975); James M. Koelemay, Jr., Monetary Relief for Trademark Infringe-
ment Under the Lanham Act, 72 TRADEMARK REP. 458, 460 n.7 (1982); Rembert Meyer-
Rochow, Passing Off—Past, Present and Future, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 38 (1994); Bev-
erly W. Pattishall, The Constitutional Foundations of American Trademark Law, 78 
TRADEMARK REP. 456, 457 (1988); Ropski, supra note 54, at 179. 
66. SCHECHTER, supra note 1. 
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ing Southern v. How as a reliable foundation of Anglo-American 
trademark law.67  He emphatically stated that “the sole contribution 
of that case was at best an irrelevant dictum of a reminiscent 
judge . . . .”68 
Much of Schechter’s hostility to the level of authority Southern 
v. How has traditionally enjoyed is apparently the result of his frus-
tration with the inconsistencies of the five accounts of the case.69  
Schechter summarized “the remarkable discrepancies occurring in 
the reports of this case” in four points.  First, Schechter noted that 
“[t]hree of the five reports contain no reference whatsoever to the 
clothier’s case in Elizabeth[‘s reign].”70  Second, of those three re-
ports, although the Popham’s abstract “definitely states the action 
to have been by the clothier whose mark had been infringed,” 
Schechter highlighted that the Croke’s abstract “is equally definite 
that the action was by the defrauded purchaser,” and the second 
Rolle’s abstract, “while not perhaps so positive in this regard, like-
 
67. Id. at 9-12, 123-26.  Other commentators have agreed with this analysis.  See 
DUNCAN MACKENZIE KERLY, KERLY’S LAW OF TRADE MARKS AND TRADE NAMES 2 (7th 
ed. 1951); Benjamin G. Paster, Trademark’s—Their Early History, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 
551, 562-63 (1969) (closely following Schechter’s analysis of the case); Edward S. 
Rogers, Some Historical Matter Concerning Trade-Marks, 9 MICH. L.R. 29 (1910), re-
printed in 62 TRADEMARK REP. 239, 251 n.30 (1972). 
68. SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 123. 
69. Id. at 9-10, 123.  In regard to the inconsistencies between the five accounts of 
Southern v. How, Schechter stated: 
To sum up the remarkable discrepancies occurring in the reports of this case:  
(1) Three of the five reports contain no reference whatsoever to the clothier’s 
case in Elizabeth[‘s reign].  (2) Of these three reports only one (Popham) defi-
nitely states the action to have been by the clothier whose mark had been in-
fringed.  Of the two others, one (Croke) is equally definite that the action was 
by the defrauded purchaser, and the other (2 Rolle 26), while not perhaps so 
positive in this regard, like-wise believes that the action was made by the 
vendee.  (3) Popham reports Dodderidge to have remembered that the clothier’s 
action occurred in 22 Elizabeth, 2 Rolle says 23 Elizabeth, while Croke’s report 
states 33 Elizabeth.  (4) Only two of the five reports (Popham and 2 Rolle 5) 
agree that Southern v. How was decided in 15 Jac. I, the other three reports giv-
ing other and different dates for the decision. 
Id. at 8-9. 
70. Id.  Only two abstracts of the case fail to mention Dodderidge’s dictum of the 
earlier unnamed clothier’s case.  See supra notes 19-47 and accompanying text (provid-
ing a discussion of the five accounts of the case).  It is fairly clear from this passage that 
Schechter meant to say that only three of the cases did mention the earlier case. 
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wise believes that the action was made by the vendee.”71  Third, 
Schechter took offense to the discrepancies between the timing of 
the action, that is, whether “the clothier’s action occurred in 22 
Elizabeth, . . . 23 Elizabeth, . . . [or] 33 Elizabeth.”72  Finally, 
Schechter observed that “[o]nly two of the five reports (Popham 
and 2 Rolle 5) agree that Southern v. How was decided in 15 Jac. I, 
the other three reports giving . . . different dates for the decision.”73 
Although Schechter’s frustration is justified, it is far from clear 
why he devoted so much effort to dislodge the case from its prece-
dential pedestal.  Because the three versions of Southern v. How 
only included a very brief, ambiguous account of the earlier un-
named action, the case could not help being what Schechter called 
“a most fragile link between the Middle Ages and the modern 
commercial law of trade-marks.”  Discrediting Southern v. How 
could not change this fact.  True to his progressive nature, how-
ever, Schechter ended his treatment of Southern v. How on a posi-
tive, hopeful note.74  Referring to the missing bridge between the 
guild jurisprudence of trademark law75 and common law protec-
tion, Schechter predicted that “[f]urther researches into the history 
of the clothier’s case mentioned in Southern v. How on the one 
hand, and into the contemporaneous activity of the councilor courts 
in the protection of trade-marks on the other, may possibly ulti-
mately furnish a satisfactory solution of our problem.”76 
Research during the late 1970s and early 1980s did exactly 
what Schechter had anticipated.  Like a phoenix, rising out of some 
“moldering mass of unpublished records of the common law” the 
 
71. SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 8-9. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 123.  Schechter appeared sincere in stating that he hoped that the unnamed 
clothier’s case made reference to by Judge Dodderidge in Southern v. How would be un-
earthed sometime in the future.  Along these lines, Schechter stated that: 
It is possible that some day in some moldering mass of unpublished records of 
the common law may be found a report of a case in the reign of Elizabeth by a 
clothier for infringement of his trade-mark that will justify the authority with 
which Southern v. How has been so unanimously endowed. 
Id. 
75. See id. at 38-77 (discussing the use and protection of marks within individual 
guilds during early English history). 
76. Id. at 126. 
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case of Sandforth slipped into the hands of an enterprising legal 
history scholar who translated the documents and published them 
for posterity.  Frank Schechter, in the end, shall have his way.  
Southern v. How finally can be supplanted in the annals of trade-
mark law by the case to which it so ambiguously referred: Sand-
forth’s Case. 
II. INTRODUCING SANDFORTH’S CASE: THE FIRST REPORTED 
TRADEMARK CASE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 
This Article embodies the first comprehensive analysis of the 
“lost” case that Judge Dodderidge referred to in Southern v. How.  
No English or American court has ever cited to it and the case has 
been ignored altogether by the mass of textbooks, treatises, law re-
view articles, and other scholarly works in the field of trademark 
and unfair competition law.  The emergence of Sandforth’s Case 
raises questions as to why the case lay dormant from 1584 to the 
late 1970s and, more strikingly, why courts and trademark scholars 
have generally failed to take notice of the discovery of this true 
foundation of Anglo-American trademark law. 
A. Explaining the Dormancy of Sandforth’s Case 
In 1972, the British Legal History Conference (“Conference”) 
was held at Aberystwyth, in Wales, to discuss the problems and 
progress in the scholarship of British legal history.77  Since then 
the Conference has met at least twelve times and has generated a 
number of valuable collections of essays devoted to the mysteries 
of the history of the law in Great Britain.78  Many of those essays 
 
77. See LAW REPORTING IN BRITAIN ix. (Chantal Stebbings ed. 1995) (reporting the 
proceedings of the British Legal History Conference).  The British Legal History Confer-
ence (“Conference”) has become the pre-eminent forum of discussion of all aspects of the 
history of British law.  Id. 
78. In addition to Law Reporting in Britain, supra note 77, the Conference has gen-
erated many other proceedings.  See, e.g., THE LIFE OF THE LAW (Peter Birks ed. 1993) 
(prepared by the Conference); LEGAL HISTORY IN THE MAKING (W.M. Gordon & T.D. 
Fergus eds., 1991) (same); LEGAL RECORD AND HISTORICAL REALITY (Thomas G. Watkin 
ed. 1989) (same); THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF LAW (Richard Eales & David Sullivan 
eds., 1987) (same); CUSTOMS, COURTS AND COUNSEL (A. Kiralfy et al. eds. 1985) (same); 
LAW, LITIGANTS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION (E.W. Ives & A.H. Manchester eds., 1983) 
(same); LEGAL RECORD AND THE HISTORIAN (J.H. Baker ed. 1978) (same); LEGAL 
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are designed to introduce the modern legal practitioner and scholar 
to the earliest law reports and their importance in the development 
of statutory and common law over twelve centuries.  Unfortu-
nately, early English law case-reporting deficiencies, particularly 
during the Elizabethan period, have had a significant impact on 
“lost” cases, such as Sandforth’s Case. 
1. The General Problem of Reporting Early Case Law 
The most significant difficulty facing British legal historians is 
the sheer volume of unpublished accounts of early case law.79  A 
significant amount of early legal history has never been printed and 
lacks an exhaustive catalogue of sources.80  The next nagging 
problem is the discovery and collection of early reports that do ex-
ist in a plethora of institutions and private collections.81 
Although the great libraries, archives, and other institutions 
 
HISTORY STUDIES (D. Jenkins ed. 1975) (same). 
79. See PERCY H. WINFIELD, THE CHIEF SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 23 
(1925).  Professor Winfield was one of the most respected legal historians of this century 
and his volume remains one of the best, most readable texts on early British law report-
ing.  The first efforts in this area of scholarship were made between 1863 and 1879 by 
Alfred John Horwood who translated and published five volumes of case reports during 
the reign of Edward I.  See Paul Brand, The Beginnings of English Law Reporting, in 
LAW REPORTING IN BRITAIN 1 (Chantal Stebbings ed. 1995).  Shortly afterwards, the Sel-
den Society was formed and began publishing translations of previously unpublished 
primary source materials.  From the 1880s until the present, the Selden Society has pre-
sented posterity with over 100 massive volumes incorporating tens of thousands of MSS 
(primary legal accounts by the earliest law reporters) occupying over 100,000 pages.  
Many of the early cases cited in this Article were obtained from the Selden Society series, 
the author having perused the indices of all available volumes for relevant case materials.  
Despite the present availability of thousands of early case reports, an untold quantity have 
yet to be discovered, translated, and published.  See WINFIELD, supra, at 23-30; Brand, 
supra, at 1. 
80. The author of the present Article can personally attest that, even 70 years after 
Winfield lamented the absence of useful indices, the Seldon Society has unfortunately 
failed to provide a comprehensive index of the sources published in its hundred-plus se-
ries of volumes. 
81. See WINFIELD, supra note 79, at 23-26.  Although the great British universities, 
namely, Oxford, Cambridge, Cantabury, etc., the British Library, the Inns of Court, and 
national archives hold much of the known MSS (primary legal accounts by the earliest 
law reporters), it is currently impossible to estimate the number of early sources that are 
in the possession of local institutions, ancient private library collections, which exist in 
large part in the manor houses of Great Britain, and foreign entities.  See id. at 24. 
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probably have improved the organization and accessibility of the 
earliest legal records in their possession, problems still exist.  Dif-
ficulties remain regarding the competent translation of legal mate-
rials.82  Also of great significance are the issues associated with 
prioritizing the treatment of the tremendous number of unpublished 
materials known to exist.83  Finally, injudicious editing of early re-
ports over the past 150 years also has taken its toll on the legal his-
tory available.  For example, Professor Baker, who discovered and 
translated Sandforth’s Case, has criticized some editors for such 
unintended censorship, stating, “Unconscious censorship by print-
ers and editors, including even Selden Society editors, has kept 
[some primary case reports] largely from sight.”84  Baker presumed 
that reports “seemed superfluous to the Year Books, as later under-
stood, and so they were treated as if they were not there.”85 
 
82. See WINFIELD, supra note 79, at 7-13 (discussing the language problems posed 
by many of the early case reports). 
83. Indeed, significant problems are posed by the frequent discovery of what pur-
ports to be the same case accounts published in volumes of vastly different dates and con-
taining varying content.  Already we have seen how the five different treatments of 
Southern v. How created confusion that lasted 350 years.  The severe difficulty, and re-
sulting frustration, of getting to the core of a particular series of case reports has plagued 
even the most respected and competent of British legal historians.  See J.H. Baker, Some 
Early Newgate Reports (1315-28), in LAW REPORTING IN BRITAIN 35 (Chantal Stebbings 
ed. 1995).  Using wit to conceal his frustration, Professor Baker, who incidentally is the 
discoverer and translator of Sandforth’s Case, explained as follows: 
I should like to dedicate this essay to the Goddess Serendipitas, who has invisi-
bly regulated so much of my research in manuscript law reports.  Twenty years 
ago I published a series of Newgate reports from 1616, which I had recently 
stumbled upon at Harvard, thinking they were the earliest of their kind.  Some-
time later, I found in the same remarkable Treasure Room a much shorter series 
of two centuries older, from 1421.  I thought these were unprinted until I ac-
quired a copy of the very rare Year Book of 9-10 Henry V published privately 
by Rogers in 1948; they are printed there, but I suspect they are still not widely 
known.  More recently, while searching through manuscript Year Books in the 
British Library, looking for moots, I found several series from the reign of Ed-
ward II and the first year of Edward III.  These, I hope and believe, are not 
known at all.  It was quite a startling find for me, because the cases are three 
hundred years earlier than I began with. 
Id. 
84. Id. at 35. 
85. Id. 
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2. Law Reporting During the Elizabethan Era 
Sandforth’s Case was heard during the middle of Queen Eliza-
beth’s reign.  It is true that the English common law had developed 
considerably during the six hundred years before Elizabeth as-
cended the throne in 1558.  Nevertheless, the record of the law thus 
developed created what one scholar termed “something of a crisis” 
by the 1590s.86  Much of the early British legal record was col-
lected in a series of volumes called the Year Books.87  One scholar, 
Percy Winfield,88 suggests that the Year Books began coverage by 
1270.89  Although far from complete in their present form, those 
Year Books provide an indispensable chronicle of British case law 
for more than 250 years.  The Year Books suddenly ceased, how-
ever, in 1535—twenty-three years before Elizabeth became mon-
arch.90  Ten years after the demise of the Year Books, the thirteen 
 
86. David Ibbetson, Law Reporting in the 1590s, in LAW REPORTING IN BRITAIN 73 
(Chantal Stebbings ed. 1995).  Demonstrating the difficulties faced by Elizabethan law-
yers and judges, Ibbetson explains: 
From the point of view of those studying law, there were hardly any didactic 
treatises; apart from Littleton’s Tenures, already well over a century old, and 
St. Germain’s discursive Doctor and Student, the few texts which did exist 
were little more than collections of relevant statutes and cases.  There had been 
no attempt to reduce the law to anything like order, so that even the best-
equipped student might be well advised simply to digest anything he had read 
under alphabetical headings, in the hope that genuine understanding might flow 
from this garnering of information. 
Id. 
87. The Year Books basically incorporate abstracts and reports of varying com-
pleteness and scope of most law cases heard during each year of the reign of the sitting 
monarch.  See WINFIELD, supra note 79, at 158-75 (discussing the apparent purposes and 
uses of the Year Books).  According to Winfield: 
On the whole, the contents of the Year-Books are of an intensely practical 
character.  They take us into the law courts and keep us there.  They do not im-
part elementary instruction, they tell us practically nothing of the theoretical 
foundations of the law.  They record all procedural moves made in an action, 
and they assume a complete familiarity with the procedure on the part of the 
men likely to use them. 
Id. at 161. 
88. See Winfield, supra note79 
89. Id. at 158-59. 
90. See id. at 171.  Ibbetson states that, even until close to the sixteenth century, the 
Year Books had been published; but after 1535, they ceased to include any new case re-
ports.  Ibbetson, supra note 86, at 74.  There was apparently a half-hearted, and ulti-
mately unsuccessful, effort made to rejuvenate publication of the Year Books in 1679.  
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judges of the realm apparently lamented the void in legal reporting 
caused thereby.91 
While the Year Books disappeared during the early sixteenth 
century, a series of case reports emerged and continued until the 
nineteenth century.92  Typically, they were compiled and made 
available by individual legal practitioners and scholars.93  Al-
though they emerged during the sixteenth century, it was not until 
the seventeenth century that these new types of published case re-
ports were able to satisfactorily replace the Year Books.  Records 
and abstracts of law cases continued to be written in manuscript 
form, but not many were published in the new reporters until after 
the sixteenth century.94  Only two volumes of reports were gener-
ated during the period between 1535 and 1590. 
It is certainly not a foregone conclusion that Sandforth’s Case 
would have been brought to light and used by succeeding genera-
tions had the Year Books continued to incorporate contemporane-
ous case reports until the end of the sixteenth century.  But it can 
be said accurately that the decline of the Year Books fifty years be-
fore the case was heard and the paucity of the new type of case re-
porters in the intervening period assuredly consigned Sandforth’s 
Case to oblivion for 420 years.  Thus, in Southern v. How, Judge 
Dodderidge had no other alternative but to rely on his imperfect 
memory to invoke Sandforth’s Case thirty-four years after it was 
 
See WINFIELD, supra note 79, at 171; 2 THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN 164-78 (J.H. 
Baker ed. 1977) [hereinafter SPELMAN REPORTS]. 
91. See JOHN W. WALLACE, THE REPORTERS 78 n.2 (4th ed. 1882). 
92. See WINFIELD, supra note 79, at 171-72 (ascribing the substitution of those se-
ries of case reports for the Year Books to the former’s superior reporting and treatment of 
the cases heard by the courts during the mid-sixteenth century). 
93. See id. 
94. See Ibbetson, supra note 86, at 73-79.  According to Ibbetson: 
While the old Year Books continued to be produced in many editions during 
the rest of the century, there was very little modern material in print.  Plow-
den’s Commentaries had appeared in 1571 and Dyer’s Reports in 1585, but al-
though these were welcome additions to the canon they merely scratched the 
surface.  The absence of recent case reports must—at the least—have inconven-
ienced practitioners who would have been forced to place greater reliance on 
the fickleness of memory. 
Id. at 73.  Winfield suggests that reliance on memory in recalling precedent was para-
mount even during the Year Book period because the Year Books’ versions of cases suf-
fered varying degrees of inconsistency.  See WINFIELD, supra note 79, at 149-50. 
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decided. 
3. A Problem in Modern Legal Scholarship 
Although it is easy to understand how Sandforth’s Case was 
lost for more than 400 years, it is more difficult to explain why the 
case continued to slumber twenty years after it was first discovered 
and identified.  The first published reference to the case occurred 
in 1979 in J.H. Baker’s survey text, An Introduction to English Le-
gal History.95  Professor Baker, while citing the case, provided no 
translation and only a scant detail of the abstract.96  There was no 
further reference to the case until Baker, together with S.F.C. Mil-
som, published their Sources of English Legal History—Private 
Law to 175097 seven years after Baker’s prior book. 
In that second book, Baker provided a complete translation of 
three documents that report Sandforth’s Case.  In a footnote he 
once again identified the case as the one referred to in Southern v. 
How.98  Since 1986, however, when the second book was pub-
lished, only one reference has been made to the case, and even that 
reference was relegated to a law review footnote.99  To explain the 
silence surrounding Sandforth’s Case for almost twenty years since 
its discovery, this Essay suggests that trademark scholars do not 
ordinarily peruse books on general British legal history to find 
support for their own literary enterprises.  Moreover, as one law 
student once mused, trademark scholars do not possess the motiva-
tion to scour law review footnotes.100 
 
95. ENGLISH HISTORY I, supra note 2, at 385 n.45.  Professor Baker identified the 
case as the same one cited in Southern v. How and recognized the case to be the first ac-
count involving trademark infringement and unfair competition.  Id. 
96. Id. 
97. BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2, at 615-18. 
98. Id. at 617 n.18. 
99. See Timothy H. Hiebert, Foundations of the Law of Parallel Importation:  Du-
ality and Universality in Nineteenth Century Trademark Law, 80 TRADEMARK REP. 483, 
492 n.45 (1990).  Although Hiebert recognized that, as of 1990, “trademark historians 
generally have been unaware of [Baker’s] significant discovery,” he himself was not in-
clined to call much attention to that discovery.  See id.  While somewhat dismayed by 
Hiebert’s reticence, the present author heartily thanks him for it. 
100. See Phil Nichols, Note, A Student Defense of Student Edited Journals:  In Re-
sponse to Professor Roger Cramton, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1122, 1131 (1987) (confessing that 
“a common joke among law review editors is that no one reads footnotes anyway”). 
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B. The Text of Sandforth’s Case 
In his publication of the case, Professor Baker includes three 
extant reports that he discovered in manuscript form.  He also re-
ferred to two additional manuscripts, which he did not furnish, that 
cite or explain the case.101  Of the three documents provided by 
Baker, one appears to be what is considered a complaint in the 
United States or a statement of claim in Great Britain and Can-
ada.102 The two other documents are abstracts of the trial. 
1. The Sandforth Complaint 
The complaint is important in the history of trademark law.103  
It states that the plaintiff in Sandford’s Case was a “clothier” who 
for twelve years, manufactured “woollen cloths called Reading 
kerseys, ‘halfes’ cloths and Bridgewaters,”104 which “were good 
and substantial without any fraud or deception in that be-
half . . . .”105  The complaint further stated that the plaintiff “was 
accustomed to mark such cloths with the letters ‘J.G.’ and with a 
sign called a tucker’s handle . . . .”106  According to the complaint, 
 
101. See BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2, at 615 n.13.  Baker cites a case entitled 
Samforde, CUL MS. Ii 5. 38, fo. 132, and another entitled Sandforth’s Case, HLS MS. 
2074, fo. 84v.  Since publication of his 1986 book, Professor Baker has discovered yet 
another brief reference to the case in BL MS. Lansdowne 1086, fo. 74v.  This last refer-
ence apparently indicates that the action was heard during the Easter term, 1585, rather 
than in 1584, the year other sources give. 
102. BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2, at 615-17 (citing Cory’s Entries, BL MS. 
Hargrave 123, fo. 168v. (British Library) (1584)). 
103. Although the complaint in Sandforth’s Case is lengthy, its importance to 
trademark law makes it worthy of review.  See Appendix, infra pp. 545-47 for the full 
text of the complaint. 
104. Id. at 615.  A “kersey” is defined as a “coarse ribbed woolen cloth for hose and 
work clothes woven first in medieval England.”  WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L 
DICTIONARY, supra note 24, at 1238.  The author could not locate an appropriate defini-
tion for the two other types of garments or cloths. 
105. BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2, at 615. 
106. Id. at 616.  The author could find no definition for a “tucker’s handle.”  Never-
theless, potentially relevant definitions for “tucker” are (1) “an attachment on a sewing 
machine for making tucks,” and (2) “a piece of lace or cloth used to fill in the low neck 
line of a dress.”  WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY, supra note 24, at 2460.  The 
latter definition asks to compare the word to the use in the phrase “bib and tucker.”  Id.  
Most likely, the noun “tuck,” as identified in the first definition of “tucker,” refers to “a 
fold stitched or woven into cloth for the purpose of shortening, decorating or controlling 
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the plaintiff sold the same cloths at home and overseas.107 
The complaint asserted that the plaintiffs customers had be-
come “accustomed” to buying “those cloths well and substantially 
made and from wool marked as above said,” by paying the same 
for those “cloths as for good and substantial cloths . . . upon the af-
firmation of the same plaintiff and his servants and factors that the 
same cloths were good and substantial, without any inspection or 
contradiction of the same cloths . . . .”108  The complaint stated that 
the plaintiff had “lawfully and honestly obtained and acquired 
much gain and profit from the making and selling of such cloths, 
for the further support and living of the same plaintiff and his 
whole family.”109 
The complaint alleged that the defendant willfully schemed and 
plotted “to hinder the same plaintiff in selling such cloths of his 
and to take away and worsen the opinion and esteem which the 
aforesaid merchants and subjects had concerning the cloths of the 
same plaintiff.”110  The complaint specifically alleged that, for two 
years, the defendant “made various woollen cloths . . . which were 
ill, insufficient and unmerchantable; and deceitfully marked the 
same cloths with the aforesaid letters ‘J.G.’ and with the aforesaid 
 
fullness.”  Id.  A “tucker’s handle” could have been a tool of a clothier’s trade.  Also po-
tentially relevant is that, during the Medieval and Renaissance periods, a “tuck” was a 
slender sword or rapier.  AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
1923 (3rd ed. 1992).  It is possible that the device used as part of the plaintiff’s trademark 
was the handle of a sword.  The author leaves it to experts in the field of medieval lan-
guages to offer a reasonable semblance of what the plaintiff’s “tucker’s handle” mark 
may have looked like. 
107. The complaints states: 
[T]he same plaintiff sold the same cloths, thus made and marked, through the 
whole of the aforesaid time, at T. aforesaid and at C. in the aforesaid county 
and in various other places within this realm of England, and likewise at M. in 
Wales and in various other places in parts beyond the seas, as well to various 
merchants and other subjects of this realm of England as to various other mer-
chants and foreigners . . . . 
BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2, at 616. 
108. Id.  This seems to indicate that the plaintiff argued for the inherent “informa-
tional” value his mark had in relation to consumers.  In this way, the plaintiff’s customers 
did not need to spend time and effort inspecting the nature and quality of each cloth be-
cause the customers associated the plaintiff’s trademark with high quality goods. 
109. Id. 
110. Id.  Thus, our first recorded infringer was allegedly willful. 
STOLTE.TYP 9/29/2006  4:44 PM 
1998] AN ANSWER TO SCHECHTER'S CONNUNDRUM 531 
mark called a tucker’s handle; and exposed for sale the same 
cloths . . . as the cloths of the same plaintiff.”111 
As a result of the defendant’s actions, “various merchants and 
other subjects who were buyers and had previously been accus-
tomed to buy[ing] the same plaintiff’s cloths,” relying on the let-
ters ‘J.G.’ and the tucker’s handle mark to identify the plaintiff’s 
cloths, bought the defendant’s cloths after seeing the “cloths 
marked with the aforesaid letters ‘J.G.’ and the aforesaid mark 
called a tucker’s handle.”112  Those buyers, who bought the defen-
dant’s cloths “without further inspection or contradiction of the 
same cloths, as being good and substantial cloths such as the cloths 
of the same plaintiff had used to be, and as being the same plain-
tiff’s cloths,” changed their opinion of the plaintiff’s cloths after 
inspecting the cloths purchased from the defendant and finding that 
the cloths were “deceitful, insufficient and unmerchantable, both in 
length and width and in quality and substance of the same 
cloths.”113  Those purchasers “not only completely reversed the 
opinion and esteem which they had previously had of the same 
cloths but also gave notice to many other merchants and subjects 
of the deceitful and insufficient making of the aforesaid cloths.”114  
Consequently, when the plaintiff attempted to sell “cloths of his 
(marked in form aforesaid)” he was unable to sell those “cloths 
(marked in form aforesaid) by reason of the deceit committed and 
used by the aforesaid defendant as set out above.”115  Thus, the 
plaintiff alleged that he was damaged because “the merchants and 
subjects aforesaid who previously used to buy such cloths from the 
same plaintiff refused to buy the same cloths from him by reason 
of the aforesaid deceit.”116 
Assuming that all allegations of the Sandforth’s complaint 
were true, what modern trademark attorney would not welcome the 
opportunity to prosecute a case with such a mass of advantageous 
 
111. Id.  This suggests that the defendant posed as the plaintiff when actually mak-
ing sales, or stated that he was an agent of the plaintiff with authority to make sales. 
112. Id. at 617. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
STOLTE.TYP 9/29/2006  4:44 PM 
532 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 8:505 
facts?  The complaint furnishes all the perks that attorneys look for 
in a trademark infringement and unfair competition suit: (1) wide 
distribution of the plaintiff’s goods, (2) an apparently distinctive 
trademark, (3) a long period of use of the mark, (4) considerable 
fame in the mark (both in the plaintiff’s own region and in other 
regions and abroad), (5) actual confusion, (6) the apparent avail-
ability of consumer witnesses that can attest to their confusion, (7) 
proof of damages, (8) the unjust enrichment of the defendant, (9) 
willful conduct on the defendant’s part, (10) passing off, (11) loss 
of reputation and good will in the plaintiff’s business, and (12) fi-
nally a poor, honest, hard working small businessman whose fam-
ily may have to sacrifice during the next winter on account of the 
defendant’s egregious conduct.  The facts as alleged in Sandforth’s 
Case provide an almost perfect plaintiff’s case, incorporating more 
useful nuggets than are generally found in modern pleadings. 
The plaintiff’s attorney seems to have framed the issues and 
facts in the complaint of Sandforth’s Case in a manner that is re-
markably modern, albiet too reliant on the now-discarded word 
“aforesaid” or its Latin counterpart.  Can it be a mere coincidence 
that a practitioner of the mid-Elizabethan age had the tools and 
presence of mind to draft a complaint that, if the pleaded facts 
were found to be true, would sail to a summary judgment, com-
plete with a grant of increased damages, attorney’s fees and costs?  
While this question calls for wild and unnecessary speculation, it 
highlights the possibility that actions of the sort found in Sand-
forth’s Case may not have been uncommon during the sixteenth 
century, and that the plaintiff’s attorney may have had doctrinal re-
sources at hand to assist him in drafting his complaint.  After all, 
contemporaneous case reports during the reigns of Edward VI, 
Mary, and Elizabeth were not collected and published in an appre-
ciable degree, but were left to languish as unnoticed and long for-
gotten manuscripts, as Sandforth’s Case had been.  In the mean-
time, we must simply encourage Professor Baker, his colleagues, 
and their successors to keep digging among the massive body of 
unpublished manuscripts for additional cases of this species. 
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2. The Sandforth Decision 
Now that we are aware of the pleaded facts of Sandforth’s 
Case, we must turn to the two extant records of the court’s deci-
sion in the case.  These abstracts are considerably less detailed than 
the complaint.  According to the text of the first abstract,117 the ac-
tion was brought by “J.S.,”118 a clothier known for making “good 
cloth” who used a mark, against “J.D.,”119 a different clothier 
known for making “bad cloth” who used another mark.120  “J.S. 
brought an action on the case against J.D.” because “J.D. set J.S.’s 
mark on his [own cloth], and by means thereof obtained good 
business (utterance).”121  At trial, “[J.D.’s] cloth was found . . . to 
be bad, and by reason thereof J.S’s cloth was discredited and he 
could not have as good business afterwards as he had before.”122 
Chief Judge Anderson123 noted that “[i]t seems the action lies, 
 
117. The text of the first abstract is as follows: 
 J.S., being a clothier who made good cloth, used a mark; and J.D., being also 
a clothier but who made bad cloth, used another mark; then J.D. set J.S.’s mark 
on his [own cloth], and by means thereof obtained good business (utterance); 
but [J.D.’s] cloth was found upon trial to be bad, and by reason thereof J.S’s 
cloth was discredited and he could not have as good business afterwards as he 
had before.  Upon all this matter J.S. brought an action on the case against J.D. 
 Anderson C.J. said it seems the action lies, because J.S. is damaged by J.D. 
using his mark. 
 Peryam J. said there was no law against anyone using whatever mark he 
wished; and when J.D. used the mark which J.S. used he did no wrong to J.S., it 
being a lawful act.  And even though J.S. was thereby damaged, he shall not 
have an action on the case for it, because it is damnum absque injuria. 
 Anderson C.J. said if someone has a house he may lawfully burn it if he 
wishes; but if by its being burned someone else’s house is burned, the latter 
shall have an action on the case; and yet it was a lawful act. 
Id. (citing the manuscript denoted as HLS MS. 2071, fo. 86). 
118. There is a discrepancy between this abstract and the complaint.  In the com-
plaint, the plaintiff’s initials (and mark) are “J.G.,” but in the abstract, the initials are 
“J.S.” 
119. Based on the manuscripts, Baker identifies the defendant as some variation of 
Samford, Sandforde, or Sandforth.  Id. at 615 n.13.  The text of this abstract identifies him 
as “J.D.” 
120. Id. at 617. 
121. Id.  The same term was used in the Popham version of Southern v. How. 
122. Id. 
123. The Chief Judge, Sir Edmund Anderson, was known to be a very independent 
and efficient jurist.  See A.L. ROWSE, THE ENGLAND OF ELIZABETH—THE STRUCTURE OF 
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because J.S. is damaged by J.D. using his mark.”124  Judge Peryam, 
however, disagreed, finding that “there was no law against anyone 
using whatever mark he wished; and when J.D. used the mark 
which J.S. used he did no wrong to J.S., it being a lawful act.”125  
Peryam added that “even though J.S. was thereby damaged, he 
shall not have an action on the case for it, because it is damnum 
absque injuria.”126  Chief Judge Anderson responded by ruling that 
“if someone has a house he may lawfully burn it if he wishes; but 
if by its being burned someone else’s house is burned, the latter 
shall have an action on the case; and yet it was a lawful act.”127 
In this abstract of the case, the Chief Judge recognized the 
damage sustained by the senior user and declared that relief is 
available under the common law.128  Judge Peryam disagreed, stat-
ing that he was not aware of any action at law that would justify 
relief, even if the plaintiff had been damaged.129  The most inter-
esting aspect of the abstract, however, is Anderson’s analogous re-
ply that the action constituted a trespass, regardless of whether the 
defendant’s conduct had theretofore been assumed lawful.  In other 
words, a merchant may choose to apply any mark he wishes to his 
 
SOCIETY 374 (1961).  The English Historian, Professor A.L. Rowse characterized Ander-
son thus: 
 Anderson, C.J., who was of Scots descent, was a quick worker, but harsh and 
brutal in manner . . . .  [H]e had certain qualities of a great judge:  he was even 
more independent than Coke [the sixteenth century’s most famous jurist]; it 
was he who stood up to Leicester over the Cavendish case and drew up the pro-
test of the judges against arbitrary imprisonment.  He came down strongly 
against a Puritan mayor of Leicester for imprisoning a man for setting up may-
poles:  the Puritans considered this a pagan survival.  One finds the judge’s ac-
tion congenial.  At the age of seventy-two, while on circuit in Somerville, con-
fronted with a disturbance, he snatched a sword from a man-at-arms, laid about 
him, and quelled it.  A man of spirit, he gave judgement according to reason; if 
he considered there was no reason in the old books, he threw them over. 
Id. 
124. BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2, at 617. 
125. Id. 
126. Id.  The term “damnum absque injuria” refers to an injury for which there is no 
legal remedy.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 393 (6th ed. 1990) (defining damnum ab-
sque injuria as a harm or loss “which does not give rise to an action for damages against 
the person causing it”). 
127. BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2, at 617. 
128. See id. 
129. See id. 
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goods—that is his right—but once his choice of a mark results in 
quantifiable damage to another merchant who had previously cho-
sen and used the mark, the former’s choice becomes actionable. 
Baker’s second abstract of Sandforth’s Case is much more in-
teresting than the first report.130  The second abstract contains a 
note by “Fletewoode,”131 stating “that an action on the case lies by 
the custom of London for counterfeiting another’s mark.”132  The 
second abstract also includes language that suggests that “Fen-
ner”133 informed the court that “‘a clothier did give the mark of an-
other clothier, but with a little difference hardly to be perceived, 
and set that on bad and false cloths, whereby the cloths of the other 
 
130. The second abstract of Sandforth’s Case reads as follows: 
 Note, by Fletewoode, that an action on the case lies by the custom of London 
for counterfeiting another’s mark.  And he put this case when the following 
matter was moved by Fenner:  ‘a clothier did give the mark of another clothier, 
but with a little difference hardly to be perceived, and set that on bad and false 
cloths, whereby the cloths of the other (which made good) were after discred-
ited.’  And it was demanded whether an action on the case lay. 
 Anderson C.J. said it did. 
 Wyndham J. agreed, if the statute enacted that no clothier shall give the mark 
of another. 
 Fletewoode.  In 5 Mar. it was adjudged in one Longe’s case accordingly in 
parliament, and the counterfeiter was [a member] of the house and for this rea-
son was put out and paid the other 300 pounds. 
 Peryam and Mead JJ. said that anyone may give what mark he will, and it is 
damnum absque injuria to the other; and deceit does not lie against him who 
does a wholly lawful act for his own profit. 
Id. at 617-18 (citing manuscript HLS MS. 5048, fo. 118v. (formerly HLS MS. Acc. 
704755, fo. 118v.)). 
131. Winfield identifies William Fletewoode as “at one time Recorder of London” 
and the indexer of the Year Book series for the reigns of Edward V, Richard III, Henry 
VII, and Henry VIII.  WINFIELD, supra note 79, at 181.  Fletewoode was also a member 
of the Middle Temple and represented parties at court at least during the 1560s.  See 
BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2, at 488 (presenting a case heard in 1565 at which Flete-
woode acted as plaintiff’s counsel).  In their index, Baker and Milsom also characterize 
Fletewoode as acting as a Sargent of Law in Sandforth’s Case.  As a Sargent of Law, 
Fletewoode could have been present at the hearing and voiced his views without neces-
sarily acting as either of the party’s counsel.  Telephone Interview with J.H. Baker (Oct. 
21, 1997). 
132. BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2, at 617-18. 
133. Edward Fenner acted as counsel during the later part of the sixteenth century 
and was later appointed as a justice to the King’s Bench sometime during the reign of 
James I.  He died in 1612. 
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(which made good) were after discredited.’”134  Furthermore, “it 
was demanded whether an action on the case lay.”135 
As in the first abstract, Chief Judge Anderson “said it did.”136  
Judge Wyndham “agreed, if the statute enacted that no clothier 
shall give the mark of another.”137  Fletewoode informed the court 
that, in “5 Mar.,”138 the matter “was adjudged in one Longe’s case 
accordingly in parliament, and the counterfeiter was [a member] of 
the house and for this reason was put out and paid the other 300 
pounds.”139  Judges Peryam and Mead said, however, “that anyone 
may give what mark he will, and it is damnum absque injuria to 
the other; and deceit does not lie against him who does a wholly 
lawful act for his own profit.”140 
As the construction of the abstract is ambiguous, it is not en-
tirely clear whether Fletewoode and Fenner represented the parties 
in Sandforth’s case in opposition to each other, jointly represented 
just the plaintiff, or acted as counsel at all.  The language, “Note, 
by Fletewoode,” might mean that the court was presented by a 
written record penned by Fletewoode relating to an earlier trade-
mark counterfeiting case heard in the House of Commons in 1558.  
Perhaps the language indicates that Fletewoode authored the ab-
stract itself or a previous version of it.  Alternatively, and more 
likely, the phrase should have read, “By Fletewoode, note that an 
action on the case lies . . . .”  If that is the correct interpretation, 
then Fletewoode could have acted as counsel in the case.  Accord-
ing to the gist of his comments, Fletewoode likely acted as plain-
tiff’s counsel; he cited an earlier precedent where an action for 
trademark counterfeiting was recognized by the House of Com-
mons. 
On the other hand, if Fletewoode acted as defendants’ counsel, 
 
134. Id.  Baker indicates that the passage in internal quotation marks was originally 
in English, indicating that the other portions of the abstract were either in Latin or 
French.  Id. at 618 n.19. 
135. Id. at 618 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. During the fifth year of the reign of Mary:  1558. 
139. Id.  The best interpretation of this phrase is that the counterfeiter was expelled 
from the House of Commons for his conduct and was forced to pay damages. 
140. Id. 
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his comments may be a badly edited effort at distinguishing the 
facts in Sandforth from the earlier case.  It would appear, by the 
language of the abstract, that Fenner probably did act as counsel 
for the plaintiff because the record states that he “moved” the mat-
ter in Sandforth.  It also is possible that both Fletewoode and Fen-
ner appeared on behalf of the plaintiff, and the silence of the de-
fendant’s counsel could be explained away by a speculation that he 
had nothing memorable to add to the proceeding.  Finally, because 
Fletewoode was a “sargent of law,” he simply could have been 
present and pointed out the prior parliamentary action to the court 
in his official position, without having represented either party. 
The jewel, and inevitably a nagging annoyance, of this abstract 
is the reference to Longe’s Case, an earlier case—reportedly heard 
in parliament and not at the Queen’s Bench—involving trademark 
infringement.  That brief citation, if ever discovered and published, 
could authoritatively push back the date of the earliest British 
trademark law to 1558—prior to the reign of Elizabeth.  Baker 
states that no record exists in the Journal of the House of Com-
mons for that year.141 
Another interesting point is that Fletewoode characterized an 
action for trademark counterfeiting as a “custom of London.”142  
That characterization, which demonstrates that trademark in-
fringement violated local London law at the time, together with the 
 
141. Id. at 618 n.1. 
142. A “custom” was a type of legal action heard by local or municipal courts, as 
opposed to common law courts.  Telephone Interview with Professor J.H. Baker (Oct. 21, 
1997).  Professor Baker indicated that Fletewoode, who had served as Recorder of Lon-
don and would therefore have been quite knowledgeable about the actions that would lie 
in a London municipal court, characterized the action in Sandforth’s Case as one which 
would ordinarily lie in a London court.  Id.  Common law courts frequently adopted the 
“customs” of important municipalities, such as London, and incorporated them into the 
common law of the realm.  Id.; see Andrea C. Loux, Note, The Persistence of the Ancient 
Regime:  Custom, Utility, and the Common Law of the Nineteenth Century, 79 CORNELL 
L. REV. 183, 185-201 (1993) (providing a thorough discussion of the history and impor-
tance of legal customs and their impact on the development of the English common law); 
see also CARLETON KEMP ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 85-88 (1927) (stating that “if a 
custom is proved in an English Court by satisfactory evidence to exist and to be observed, 
the function of the Court is merely to recognize the custom as operative law”).  See gen-
erally Albert Kiralfy, Custom in Mediaeval English Law, 9 J. LEGAL HIST. 26 (1988) 
(discussing differences in customs based on geography, as well as the various customs in 
specific areas of the law). 
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fact that in Sandforth’s Case and possibly in an even earlier, pre-
Elizabethan parliamentary case, trademark infringement was ac-
tionable, would strengthen the contention that the origins of the 
common law of trademarks should be securely assigned to the six-
teenth century and not, as historically argued, the nineteenth. 
III. THE IMPACT OF SANDFORTH’S CASE 
Although the reports of Sandforth’s Case undoubtedly will 
pose more questions than they answer, one question that should be 
addressed now is whether the case represents the old action for the 
tort of deceit or an entirely new type of action, theretofore unrec-
ognized and uncategorized.  Certainly, if the case was an action for 
deceit, it is a hybrid.  Ultimately, the answer to this question will 
not detract from the newly established authority of Sandforth’s 
Case as the first reported action for trademark infringement.  But it 
may support the argument that in Elizabethan England, the com-
mon law courts, responding to a quickly changing and expanding 
mercantile economy, promulgated a new tort, separate from that of 
deceit, and in later cases in later centuries, reverted back to the 
nomenclature of deceit. There is not enough in Sandforth’s Case to 
justify the viability of such an argument, but any attempt to fit the 
case into the tort of deceit poses significant difficulties. 
A. Categorizing Sandforth’s Case 
In his assertion that a case did not lie, Justice Peryam specifi-
cally identified the tort doctrine he thought was being invoked as 
deceit.  At the time Sandforth’s Case was decided, Peryam’s posi-
tion appears to have been the stronger one; it was supported by the 
common law of the day.  Even though Peryam’s position appears 
to be correct, his rationale was not.  Peryam reasoned that a mer-
chant could use any trademark he fancied, including the famous 
and successful marks of competitors.  The actual reason that Sand-
forth’s Case should not have been actionable in deceit is that at 
least one—and possibly two—elements normally required under 
the sixteenth century common law of deceit were missing: a war-
ranty by the defendant and a relationship of privity, or at least a re-
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lationship of trust, between the parties.143 
The requirement of a warranty in cases involving deceit was 
firmly established within the common law between the fourteenth 
and sixteenth centuries.  Essentially, an action for deceit would lie 
only if the plaintiff could establish that the defendant warranted 
goods or services and subsequently breached his warranty.144  In 
1604, the Court of the Exchequer confirmed that the warranty rule 
prevailed in the British common law.145  A few years later, how-
ever, in another case involving the same parties, the court of the 
King’s Bench relieved the plaintiff from the burden of showing 
that a warranty existed, relying instead on the defendant’s fraudu-
lent intent as an alternative.146  Other cases required privity or 
some relationship of trust between the parties as well.147  In Sand-
forth’s Case, there is no warranty made by the defendant, at least 
not made to the plaintiff.  Furthermore, it seems clear that there 
was no relationship between the parties, either in privity or in trust.  
Therefore, Sandforth’s Case does not appear to fit into the com-
mon law action for deceit. 
Nevertheless, some legal historians have depicted the action for 
 
143. See supra note 27 (discussing reported cases in deceit arising during the four-
teenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries). 
144. See S.F.C. MILSOM, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 105, 126-
30 (1985) (discussing the warranty requirement as applied to the sale of goods in the fif-
teenth century); S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 276-77, 
316-21 (1969) (examining the requisite of a warranty in actions for deceit). 
145. Chandelor v. Lopus, 79 ENG. REP. 3, 3-4 (Ex. 1604).  Here the Court of Ex-
chequer stated that: 
[T]he bear affirmation that it was a bezar-stone, without warranting it to be so, 
is no cause of action; and although he knew it to be no bezar-stone, it is not ma-
terial; for every one in selling his wares will affirm that his wares are good, or 
the horse which he sells is sound; yet if he does not warrant them to be so, it is 
no cause of action. 
Id.  The author could find only one case sounding in deceit before the seventeenth cen-
tury where a court may have relaxed the warranty rule.  Commentator’s Note, Caryll’s 
Reports, Keil 91, pl 16 (1505), reprinted in BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2, at 516. 
146. Lopus v. Chandler, YLS M.S. G.R. 29.17, fo. 157v; YLS M.S. G.R. 29.18, fo. 
123v; HLS M.S. 118, fo. 114v (1606), reprinted in BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2, at 
520-22. 
147. See, e.g., Lord Mounteagle v. Countess of Worcester, Dyer’s Reports, 121, BL 
M.S. Harley 1691, fo. 94 (1555) (requiring privity or a relationship of trust between the 
parties); Anon, Year Book, Trinity Term, 11 Edw. IV, fo. 6, pl. 10 (1471); Anon, Year 
Book, Michealmas Term, 9 Hen. VI, fo. 53v, pl. 37 (1430). 
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deceit as evolving as early as the sixteenth century.148  For exam-
ple, Professor Baker contends that the term deceit, or its Latin or 
French equivalents, were invoked to characterize all kinds of cases 
of trespass, devoid of any true basis in the old common law tort of 
deceit.149  According to Baker, “[d]eceit [was] featured at one stage 
or another in most other actions on the case for wrongs.150  Con-
version was a ‘plea of trespass and deceit’ or ‘deceit on the case’; 
but here again the deceit was to become, probably by the mid-
sixteenth century, a meaningless allegation.”151 
Sandforth’s Case may be an example of the abuse—alluded to 
by Baker—of attaching the nomenclature of an established tort to 
an action where the facts of the case do not fit the tort’s parame-
ters.  The Sandforth court, looking for the nearest analogous doc-
trine of tort to fit the facts, may have simply settled for deceit.  We 
will never know this.  Moreover, it is unknown whether the action 
for deceit had expanded by the time of Sandforth’s Case to ease 
the requirements of warranty and privity.  Whatever the ultimate 
answers to those questions, Sandforth’s Case clearly establishes 
trademark infringement as a violation of sixteenth century common 
law. 
B. Placing Sandforth’s Case in the Commercial and Economic 
Context of Sixteenth Century England 
Whether the court in Sandforth’s Case created a new tort or 
expanded the scope of an action for deceit to encompass trademark 
infringement and unfair competition is, at this point, of little con-
sequence.  Regardless of its doctrinal basis, the court recognized 
that the prevailing economic and commercial realities of the realm 
required the promulgation or expansion of the common law to pro-
tect merchants against trademark piracy and unfair methods of 
competition in the marketplace.  Anticipating the substantial de-
velopment of the law during the Industrial Revolution 250 years 
later, the courts of the Elizabethan era witnessed extraordinary 
 
148. See SPELMAN REPORTS, supra note 90, at 230-32. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 232 (citations omitted). 
151. Id. (citations omitted). 
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economic and commercial growth throughout England and proba-
bly had little alternative but to fashion the common law to meet the 
exigencies of the times. 
With the advent of the Tudor Monarchy,152 the English Middle 
Ages came to an end.153  The sixteenth century brought to England 
a tremendous growth in commerce and the economy.154  In fact, 
during this period, England experienced so much progress in its in-
ternal economy as well as its development of external markets that 
the century “amounted to a sort of Industrial Revolution.”155 
 
152. The House of Tudor, which assumed hold of the British throne in 1485, pro-
duced three of the most dynamic monarchs in English history.  The Tudor Monarchy was 
ushered in after the bloody Battle of Bosworth Field, when Henry Tudor, a bastard pre-
tender to the throne, vanquished Richard III, thus putting an end to the War of the Roses, 
which disrupted English commerce and society for thirty years.  See generally J.R. 
LANDER, THE WARS OF THE ROSES (1965); JOSEPH R. STRAYER & DANA C. MUNRO, THE 
MIDDLE AGES 395-1500, at 500-06 (5th ed. 1970).  Henry Tudor was coronated as Henry 
VII and his direct future lineage included Henry VIII, Edward VI, Mary, and Elizabeth I, 
the death of the latter in 1603 extinguishing the Tudor hold on the British throne. 
153. See generally JACOB BURCKHARDT, THE CIVILIZATION OF THE RENAISSANCE IN 
ITALY (1860) (expressing the view that the late Middle Ages was a period of economic 
and cultural decline); F.R.H. DU BOULAY, AN AGE OF AMBITION:  ENGLISH SOCIETY IN 
THE LATE MIDDLE AGES (1970) (exploring the transformation of social, economic, cul-
tural, and religious forces and institutions at the close of the fifteenth century); J. 
HUISZINGA, THE WANING OF THE MIDDLE AGES (1955) (sharing Burckhardt’s views of the 
late Medieval period in England); PERCIVAL HUNT, FIFTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 
(1962) (offering the view that the late Middle Ages was less a period of stagnancy and 
decline and more a bridge to the Renaissance than generally supposed). 
154. See EDWARD P. CHEYNEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INDUSTRIAL AND SOCIAL 
HISTORY OF ENGLAND 116-51 (1937).  Focusing on the notable distinction of the six-
teenth century as a passing of one era to another, from the Middle Ages to what we like 
to refer to as “modern times,” Professor Cheyney opined that: 
 The century and a half which extends from the middle years of the fifteenth 
century to the close of the sixteenth was, as has been shown, a period remark-
able for the extent and variety of its changes in almost every aspect of society.  
In the political, intellectual, and religious world the sixteenth century seemed 
far removed from the fifteenth.  It is not therefore a matter of surprise that eco-
nomic changes were numerous and fundamental, and that social organization in 
town and country alike was completely transformed. 
Id. at 120-21; see also GEORGE CLARK, THE WEALTH OF ENGLAND 1496-1760, at 57-89 
(1961) (arguing that mercantile enterprise and the development of a money economy re-
sulted in the wide availability and significant surpluses of raw materials and finished 
goods during the sixteenth century). 
155. J.U. Nef, War and Economic Progress, 1540-1640, ECON. HIST. REV. 25 
(1942).  England, more than any other country of Europe, tied its economic advancement 
to the new science and technology ushered in during the Renaissance.  ROWSE, supra 
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While land was still the economic basis for making and main-
taining family fortunes during the period, the century saw a rise in 
local markets, the increasing availability of consumable goods, and 
a significant escalation of exports to the continent and other parts 
of the world.156  New inventions and technological advances vastly 
expanded Britain’s industrial capabilities, thereby increasing the 
production and distribution of goods throughout the realm and be-
yond.157  Moreover, the recent discovery and colonization of North 
and South America, and the colonization of parts of India, Asia, 
 
note 123, at 112. According to Professor Rowse: 
England achieved the position of leadership in industrial technology and heavy 
industry she held till the late nineteenth century largely during the century be-
tween the Dissolution and the Civil War [1540-1640]; that Elizabeth’s reign 
saw a shift in the centre of progress in both science and technology from the 
continent to [England], where more fresh industries were started and more new 
kinds of machinery and furnaces were developed than in any other country.  
The Renaissance impulse signalised itself in a host of new inventions:  the 
printing press, the blast furnace, furnaces for separating silver from copper ore, 
for using coal in glass making, steel and brick-making for drying malt in brew-
ing, boring rods for exploring underground stata, horse and water driven en-
gines for draining mines—an immense field of development [in England] as 
new mines were opened up and old workings deepened; the stocking knitting 
frame, the Dutch loom for knitting small wares, besides more specialized scien-
tific devices. 
Id.  Many historians believe that the seeds of the later Industrial Revolution of the nine-
teenth century were sown during the Elizabethan era.  “The rise of industrialism in Great 
Britain can be more properly regarded as a long process stretching back to the middle of 
the sixteenth century . . . than as a sudden phenomenon associated with the 18th and 19th 
centuries.”  J.U. Nef, The Progress of Technology and the Growth of Large-Scale Indus-
try in Great Britain, 1540-1640, ECON. HIST. REV. 22 (1934). 
156. See CHEYNEY, supra 154, at 136-50; CLARK, supra note 154, at 176-87.  In 
explaining the economic progress that occurred in England during the reign of Elizabeth, 
Professor Rowse states: 
There were the striking improvements in industrial and financial technique; the 
increased mobility of labour, particularly in the iron, coal and glass industries, 
special fields for the new capitalist; the growth of investment in new enter-
prises, the opening up of markets in America, Asia [and] Africa.  In all these 
things, England, at length, caught up and went ahead. 
ROWSE, supra note 123, at 109. 
157. See CHEYNEY, supra note 154, at 138-42.  For example, during the middle of 
the fourteenth century, the longest list of merchants engaged in any appreciable degree of 
commerce contained only 169 names.  See id. at 139.  By 1500, however, over 3,000 
merchants engaged in foreign trade and many thousands more engaged in the native 
commerce of England.  See id.  By the end of the sixteenth century, over 3,500 merchants 
traded with the Netherlands alone.  See id. 
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and Africa during the century, made no small impact on the growth 
of British industry. 
Local craftsmen and artisans made way for a new class of 
businessmen, the merchant-adventurers.158  As a result of this and 
the vast expansion of industry and foreign trade in general, the 
guilds, which had theretofore dominated as the regulating force in 
the English economy, began to decline in membership and influ-
ence.159  Schechter demonstrated that it was the guilds that regu-
lated the earliest form of “trademark law” in Great Britain.160  It is 
highly probable that the decline of the guilds, the escalation of the 
powers of the general government, and the growing influence of 
the merchant-adventurers in the English economy converged at this 
period in removing the regulation of trademarks from the “guild 
jurisprudence” to the common law courts.161 
 
158. See id. at 139-43.  There was such a surplus of new finished goods during this 
period that England’s export trade flourished.  See id.  The new wealth also resulted in 
the greater desire for foreign luxury items and other types of imports.  See id.  During the 
sixteenth century, Britain’s import-export business was booming.  According to Cheyney: 
These merchants exported the old articles of English production and to a still 
greater extent textile goods, the manufacture of which was growing so rapidly 
in England.  The export of [raw] wool came to an end during the reign of 
Queen Elizabeth, but the export of woven cloth was more than enough to take 
its place.  There was not so much cloth now imported, but a much greater vari-
ety of foodstuffs and wines, of articles of fine manufacture, and of the special 
products of the countries to which English trade extended. 
Id. at 139.  In fact, the merchant-adventurers had become so numerous, wealthy, and in-
fluential during the century that they furnished 10 out of the 16 London ships sent to as-
sist the British fleet in destroying the Spanish Armada.  See id. at 142. 
159. See id. at 135-38. 
160. SCHECHTER, supra note 1, at 38-77. 
161. CHEYNEY, supra note 154, at 136-38.  According to Cheyney: 
Thus the gilds lost the unity of their membership, were weakened by the growth 
of industry outside of their sphere of control, superseded by the government in 
many of their economic functions, deprived of their administrative, legislative 
and jurisdictional freedom, robbed of their religious duties and of the property 
which had enabled them to fulfil them, and no longer possessed even the bond 
of their dramatic interests.  So the fraternities which had embodied so much of 
the life of the people of the towns during the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fif-
teenth centuries now came to include within their organization fewer and fewer 
persons and to affect a smaller and smaller part of their interests.  Although the 
companies continued to exist into later times, yet long before the close of the 
period . . . they had become relatively inconspicuous and insignificant. 
Id. at 137. 
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With the guilds in decline, the plaintiff in Sandforth’s Case, 
and potentially others like him during the sixteenth century, proba-
bly viewed the common law courts as a more appropriate forum 
for obtaining relief against a trademark pirate.  “J.G.,” or whatever 
his name may have been, could expect the courts of that period to 
render a judgment that made sense in light of the economic and 
commercial context of that time.  As the Industrial Revolution of 
the nineteenth century made it imperative to extend substantial le-
gal protection against trademark infringement and unfair competi-
tion, so too did the earlier, more contained “Industrial Revolution” 
of the sixteenth century. 
CONCLUSION 
More than seventy years ago, the legal scholar Frank Schechter 
challenged other legal scholars and historians to find a bridge link-
ing the regulation of trademark usage by the medieval English 
trade guilds to the later assumption of trademark jurisprudence by 
the common law courts of the nineteenth century.  Schechter fully 
discounted the case of Southern v. How as providing such a bridge.  
The recent discovery of Sandforth’s Case now allows us to disre-
gard Southern v. How as the earliest basis for trademark and unfair 
competition law in English legal history.  Moreover, Sandforth’s 
Case, together with the unreported parliamentary action in Longe’s 
Case, provide the historical bridge linking guild regulation of 
trademarks to the development of trademark jurisprudence by the 
common law courts as early as the mid-sixteenth century, 250 
years before Sykes v. Sykes, the case that Schechter declared to be 
“the first reported case squarely involving the protection of trade-
marks by an English common law court.” 
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APPENDIX 
THE COMPLAINT IN SANDFORTH’S CASE 
Although the complaint in Sandforth’s Case is somewhat 
lengthy, its importance in the history of trademark law makes it 
worthy of full review.  Accordingly, an annotated version of the 
complaint is provided in its entirety as follows: 
[The plaintiff, by his attorney, complains]162 that, whereas 
the same plaintiff is a clothier, and for 12 years past at T.163 
in the county aforesaid used the art and mystery [of mak-
ing]164 woollen cloths called Reading kerseys, “halfes” 
cloths and Bridgewaters,165 and during all that time all such 
cloths as he made at T. aforesaid were good and substantial 
without any fraud or deception in that behalf; and for the 
whole of the aforesaid time he was accustomed to mark 
such cloths with the letters ‘J.G.’ and with a sign called a 
tucker’s handle;166 and the same plaintiff sold the same 
cloths, thus made and marked, through the whole of the 
aforesaid time, at T. aforesaid and at C.167 in the aforesaid 
county and in various other places within this realm of Eng-
 
162. See BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2 (providing the bracketed text). 
163. Location unknown.  Some versions of Southern v. Hall indicated that the plain-
tiff operated his business out of Glouchester or somewhere in Glouchestershire. 
164. See BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2 (providing the bracketed text). 
165. A “kersey” is defined as a “course ribbed woolen cloth for hose and work 
clothes woven first in medieval England.”  WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 
1238 (1986).  The author could not locate an appropriate definition for the two other 
types of garments or cloths. 
166. The author could find no definition for a “tucker’s handle.”  However, during 
the Medieval and Renaissance periods, a “tuck” was a slender sword or rapier.  
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1923 (3rd ed. 1992).  It is 
possible that the device used as part of the plaintiff’s trademark was the handle of a 
sword. Other potentially relevant definitions for “tucker” are (1) “an attachment on a 
sewing machine for making tucks” and (2) a piece of lace or cloth used to fill in the low 
neck line of a dress.”  WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, supra note 100, at 2460.  The latter defi-
nition asks to compare the word to the use in the phrase “bib and tucker.”  Id.  The defini-
tion for the most likely noun “tuck” identified in the first definition of “tucker” is “a fold 
stitched or woven into cloth for the purpose of shortening, decorating or controlling full-
ness.” Id.  A “tucker’s handle” could have been a tool of a clothier’s trade. 
167. Location unknown. 
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land, and likewise at M.168 in Wales and in various other 
places in parts beyond the seas, as well to various mer-
chants and other subjects of this realm of England as to 
various other merchants and foreigners; and the buyers 
thereof were accustomed for eight years169 last past to buy 
those cloths well and substantially made and from wool 
marked as above said, from the same J.G.170 at all the afore-
said several places, and to pay for the same cloths as for 
good and substantial cloths (the same cloths in truth being 
good and substantial), upon the affirmation of the same 
plaintiff and his servants and factors that the same cloths 
were good and substantial, without any inspection or con-
tradiction of the same cloths;171 and by reason thereof the 
same plaintiff throughout the aforesaid time lawfully and 
honestly obtained and acquired much gain and profit from 
the making and selling of such cloths, for the further sup-
port and living of the same plaintiff and his whole family: 
[nevertheless]172 the defendant, being not unaware of the 
foregoing, scheming and plotting to hinder the same plain-
tiff in selling such cloths of his and to take away and 
worsen the opinion and esteem which the aforesaid mer-
chants and subjects had concerning the cloths of the same 
plaintiff, for the space of two years now past at T. aforesaid 
made various woollen cloths called etc. which were ill, in-
sufficient and unmerchantable; and deceitfully marked the 
same cloths with the aforesaid letters ‘J.G.’ and with the 
aforesaid mark called a tucker’s handle; and exposed for 
sale the same cloths, so insufficiently and deceitfully made 
and marked as aforesaid, in the aforesaid several places, as 
the cloths of the same plaintiff and under the aforesaid 
 
168. Location unknown. 
169. The document previously states that the plaintiff had manufactured and mar-
keted his cloths for twelve years, not eight. 
170. Only the initials of the plaintiff are given. 
171. This would seem to indicate that the plaintiff argued for the inherent “informa-
tional” value his mark had to consumers.  The plaintiff’s customers need not spend time 
and effort inspecting the nature and quality of each cloth since the customers’ association 
of the plaintiff’s trademark with high quality goods had already been established. 
172. See BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2 (providing the bracketed text). 
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mark and letters, in the name of the selfsame plaintiff,173 
whereupon various merchants and other subjects who were 
buyers and had previously been accustomed to buy the 
same plaintiff’s cloths, trusting to the aforesaid words and 
[seeing] the aforesaid cloths marked with the aforesaid let-
ters ‘J.G.’ and the aforesaid mark called a tucker’s handle, 
bought the same cloths (deceitfully and insufficiently made 
by the defendant aforesaid) from the same defendant, with-
out further inspection or contradiction of the same cloths, 
as being good and substantial cloths such as the cloths of 
the same plaintiff had used to be, and as being the same 
plaintiff’s cloths; and the aforesaid buyers, when they later 
inspected the aforesaid cloths deceitfully sold by the afore-
said defendant as aforesaid, and found the aforesaid cloths 
to be deceitful, insufficient and unmerchantable, both in 
length and width and in quality and substance of the same 
cloths, not only completely reversed the opinion and es-
teem which they had previously had of the same cloths but 
also gave notice to many other merchants and subjects of 
the deceitful and insufficient making of the aforesaid 
cloths; and as a result of this same plaintiff, when he re-
cently desired to sell certain good and substantial cloths of 
his (marked in form aforesaid) at the aforesaid places, and 
there exposed the same cloths for sale, could not sell those 
good and substantial cloths (marked in form aforesaid) by 
reason of the deceit committed and used by the aforesaid 
defendant as set out above, but the merchants and subjects 
aforesaid who previously used to buy such cloths from the 
same plaintiff refused to buy the same cloths from him by 
reason of the aforesaid deceit; to the damage etc.174 
 
173. This may mean that the defendant assumed the imposture of the plaintiff him-
self when actually making his sales, or that he stated himself to be the latter’s agent, and 
therefore authorized by the plaintiff to make the sales. 
174. Sandforth’s Case, BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 2, at 615-17 (citing Cory’s 
Entries, BL MS. Hargrave 123, fo. 168v. (British Library) (1584)) (alterations in origi-
nal) (citations omitted) (footnotes added). 
